AUSTRALIAN
AND NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOINT
MEETING, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA
OPENING
SESSION MONDAY 26 JUNE 2000
INTERNATIONAL LAW - DOWN IN THE ENGINEROOM
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG
THE LUCKY ONES
We are the lucky ones. To this generation much is
given. The lawyers and judges of today are living through
a remarkable rapprochement between international and municipal
law.
Some have suggested that the process involves a dangerous liaison.
Some fear the corrupting influence and seduction of the plain
folks of municipal law by the fascinating interloper from outside.
But my thesis is that the development is one natural to the social,
intellectual and technological features of the age we live in.
It is necessary to the resolution of the problems of the planet
we inhabit. It is beneficial to the rule of law, the maintenance
of peace and security and the defence of human rights in every
land. This is why we are the lucky ones, for we have the
chance to see the future and to contribute to it in a way that
no previous generation of lawyers could do.
Australia's wealthiest man (if we now omit our erstwhile citizen
but frequent visitor Rupert Murdoch) is another media owner, Mr
Kerry Packer. When he almost died of a heart attack a few
years ago, he went through a near death experience. Upon
his recovery he declared that he had been to the other side and
that there was "nothing there". This was uncharacteristically
ungenerous of him, given the heroic efforts of the surgeons and
the confident prayers of the Sisters at St Vincent's Hospital
at Sydney where he was nursed back to health. I too have
been to the other side of international law. I am here today
to tell you that there is a lot there. It is all happening
at once. If it does not quite measure up to one's aspiration
of heaven: nor is it properly described as hell (except
for the occasional bureaucratic experiences).
I have no competence to speak about the great disputes of politics
which capture the headlines and preoccupy the political organs
of the international and regional institutions of an interdependent
world. Nor do I intend to speak about the growing significance
of the International Court of Justice
or even of the International Criminal Tribunals and the proposed
Court that have responded to special problems in recent years.
Instead, I want to take you down into the engineroom of international
law. Down to the international agencies and municipal courts
in which, today, lawyers and judges have special opportunities
to contribute to the growth and influence of international law
in practice. This is where I have seen the other side.
It is where one finds not a few angels and secular saints who
have a deep commitment to building a new world order that upholds
international peace and security in an environment of economic
equity and with respect for universal human rights.
Because a great change has happened in my lifetime, it has happened
in yours. It is happening today, and it will gather pace,
in the lifetimes of the young lawyers now graduating from law
schools in Australia, New Zealand, the United States and far beyond.
To give you some idea of the range and variety of activities that
are occurring in the engineroom of international law, let me illustrate
my thesis with some examples from my own life. I am sure
that many who read and hear these remarks could offer similar
stories. I will deal first with some experiences in international
agencies which have convinced me that international law and practice
is now a highly practical and useful subject. Then I will
take you into my courtroom in Australia where international legal
questions arise all the time and with increasing importance and
urgency.
THE AGENCIES
For me, it all began when I was appointed chairman of the
Australian Law Reform Commission twenty-five years ago.
Soon afterwards, the Commission was required by the Federal Attorney-General
to prepare a report for the Australian Parliament on privacy protection.
This task coincided with the establishment by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of an Expert Group
to develop guidelines on privacy protection in the context of
transborder data flows. That was an unusual task for the
OECD. Looking back, we can see it as an early portent of
the increasing moves in recent years of that hard-nosed combination,
the OECD, the World Bank, the International Money Fund (IMF) and
the World Trade Organisation into areas of governance without
which economic advancement will be a hollow achievement, if it
is attainable at all.
I was elected chairman of the OECD group. We prepared our
guidelines.
They were adopted by the Council of the OECD. They were
as much designed to prevent the economic inefficiency of disparate
municipal regulation of the new information technology as to defend
fundamental human rights. Eventually most OECD countries,
including Australia and New Zealand, accepted the guidelines
In this country (as in New Zealand) they provided the basis for
privacy principles incorporated in privacy protection legislation.
Through the Law Reform Commission, I was able to see the highly
practical way in which a legal project at an international level
could assist and influence municipal law-making. After that,
I could never accept that international law - even soft law -
was a matter for scholars and theorists alone. In countries
as far apart as Japan, the Netherlands and Australia, the deliberations
of our group in Paris had a real, practical and beneficial
effect on local law and international cooperation.
In the manner of these things, one engagement leads to another.
Soon after the OECD work was completed I took part in the general
conference of UNESCO, also in Paris. That organisation was
in the bitter throes of what became the withdrawal of the United
States and the United Kingdom, the former alas not yet repaired.
Strangely enough, one of the given reasons for the United States
withdrawal was the insistence of Director-General M'bow that UNESCO
should continue the exploration of the meaning in the common first
articles to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights which promise the self-determination of peoples.
Who were a "people" for this purpose?
It always seemed to me particularly odd that the United States
should have opposed the exploration of this idea, given the famous
opening words of the Declaration of Independence. But
the United States quit UNESCO and, to its great credit, that organisation
went on with the exploration of the issue of self-determination.
I was appointed to the group and ultimately elected as rapporteur
and chairman. Our task was to examine who were a "people"
entitled to this promised right. It was, and is, a highly
controversial topic. It is uncongenial to many nation states.
It is even unwelcome to some people in Australia. But who
can doubt, looking at the real causes of conflict in the world
today, that this is one of the great issues of international law
- from East Timor to Acheh; from Burma to Tibet; from Palestine
to Kosovo; from Corsica to Ulster; from the Falklands to Nunavut;
and most recently from Fiji, Bougainville, West Irian and Solomon
Islands to Aboriginal Australia. This is an issue that circles
the earth and goes to the heart of most contemporary dangers to
international peace and security. It concerns the rights
of peoples but also the human rights of the individuals who make
up those peoples.
The UNESCO expert group completed its task. It identified
four elements necessary to constitute a "people" for
international law purposes.
It is a misfortune that many who are unaware of the body of international
law on this subject mistake self-determination for total national
independence. That is a possible but not a necessary attribute
of self-determination. This is a message from international
law that needs to be learned in many countries.
By the time the work of the UNESCO groups was completed the HIV/AIDS
pandemic was upon the world. I then met one of the truly
noble participants in the building of international law - a United
States doctor who called me to serve on the World Health Organisation
Global Commission on AIDS. This was Dr Jonathan Mann who
tragically lost his life in 1998 en route to Geneva for
a meeting on HIV vaccines. The Global Commission established
principles for the management of the HIV epidemic, now being
pursued by that unique inter-agency body, UNAIDS. Implementing
the guidelines has been by no means easy, given the cultural impediments
that exist in various countries. It has fallen on some of
the participating agencies, such as the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) to attempt to persuade governments and bureaucracies
in affected countries to adopt the bold strategies that will help
reduce the spread of the virus. Significantly, those countries
which have done so (including Australia) have seen the graph of
sero-conversions to HIV plateau and even fall. Those countries
which have not (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of
Asia) have witnessed rapid escalation in the spread of the virus.
Even that secular saint, Nelson Mandela of South Africa , could
not bring himself to support effectively the UNAIDS strategy.
His successor, President M'beke, seems to be embracing denial
and unorthodox medical theories, for example that HIV is not the
cause of AIDS. An international meeting in Durban in a month's
time may give a new beginning to international strategies in southern
Africa designed to tackle this affliction of the human family.
UNAIDS guidelines
worked out in 1997 at meetings held in concert with the United
Nations Centre for Human Rights which I have chaired, provide
reflections of consensus amongst the most informed public health
and epidemiological experts in the world. The guidelines
afford a stimulus to the recalcitrant or the ignorant leaders
and officials of nation states. This is not international
law in the traditional sense. But the influence of such
guidelines, carried into municipal bureaucracies by WHO and UNAIDS
experts, fired with a zeal to prevent the ravages of AIDS, can
sometimes have a direct local impact far greater than high-sounding
treaties. This is international cooperation and principle
turned to the vital effort to save human lives. Without
international law and international agencies it would just be
a dream.
In two other specialised agencies of the United Nations I have
witnessed the practical helping hand that can sometimes be offered
to domestic law-making. In 1991-92 I participated with two
other judges in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Fact-Finding
and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association. Our
particular task, just before the achievement of constitutional
change, was to examine the labour laws of South Africa and to
advise on the standards they had to attain in order to conform
to ILO Conventions. Having walked out of the ILO rather
than be expelled during the apartheid years, South Africa's labour
laws had fallen into serious disrepair. South Africa was
keen to repair its relationship with international legal norms.
The ILO mission examined closely the letter and practice of the
South African law. Its report, delivered to the de Klerk
government was subsequently acted upon by the Mandela government.
A new Labour Relations Act was adopted, complying with
ILO standards.
In 1994, UNDP arranged my participation in a number of meetings
leading up to the constitutional conference in Malawi. It
was that conference which agreed on the text of constitutional
changes designed to usher in a multi-party democracy in the place
of the one-party rule of President Hastings Banda. After
a referendum and elections, a peaceful change of government was
accomplished in Malawi. I pay tribute to the fine officers
of UNDP and other agencies who facilitated this remarkable change
in Malawi and in other lands. This was truly a translation
of the universal principles of human rights into action in a particular
country. I do not believe that it could have happened without
the skills of United Nations agencies which I saw in operation
at first hand.
In more recent years I have been privileged to take part in the
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO. That body has
been grappling with some of the most difficult legal and ethical
questions confronting humanity. I refer to the quandaries
presented by genomic science and the development of the Human
Genome Project. The UNESCO Committee in 1998 adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Genome.
This contains a number of basic norms aimed to provide a framework
for a global response to legal and ethical questions relevant
to the entire human species.
It is possible that in due course this Universal Declaration will
lead on to a treaty, as others in the past have done. The
point to be made is that an international agency, calling on diverse
expertise and viewpoints from different religions and cultures,
is seeking to design an effective universal response. The
difficulties of securing such a response in a world of so many
different starting points and where large investments and differing
national intellectual property regimes apply, is not to be under-estimated.
Within the last few weeks I was called to Vienna by the United
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Under
the aegis of that agency, a Global Programme Against Corruption
has been established. Several international agencies, including
the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organisation,
have been concerning themselves with the problem of corruption
and its insidious effect on municipal governmental institutions.
A judicial group on strengthening judicial integrity has now been
established in Vienna working directly to the United Nations office
there.
This group comprises four Chief Justices from Asia and four from
Africa. At present, all of them are from countries of the
common law tradition. The intention, in due course, is to
establish similar groups in Latin America, Central and Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union and perhaps elsewhere. The
task is to draw up strategies, including a universal minimum code
of judicial conduct. Wisely, the Vienna agency is leaving
the task to the judges themselves, supported by research and other
staff, as well as by informed non-governmental organisations,
such as Transparency International in London and the Centre for
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers within the International
Commission of Jurists in Geneva.
In due course it may be expected that the Vienna Group will draw
up judicial guidelines. These will afford a framework for
action by United Nations agencies and member countries.
Whether these guidelines may lead to treaty obligations or be
given effect as conditional requirements imposed by the OECD,
the World Bank, the IMF or the World Trade Organisation, remains
to be seen. Effective international law cannot be dismissed.
Pursuant to an OECD Convention, long arm legislation has been
enacted both in the United Sates and Australia, to render it a
crime for nationals of those countries to engage overseas in corruption
of foreign officials. The point to be made is that, once
again, an issue of common concern has attracted a universal response
under and outside the aegis of the United Nations. The sharing
of research and knowledge and the pooling of ideas will contribute
to global standards and hopefully effective action, not just papers
and talk.
I tell these stories not to enlarge my own role in any of these
multifarious activities. My role has been relatively minor.
Instead, it is told to illustrate, by reference to some activities
with which I am familiar, the rapid advance of international initiatives,
many of them relevant to law. What, only forty years ago,
was basically the concern and responsibility of the nation states
has increasingly become an issue for international cooperation,
the development of universal guidelines, the involvement of people
and their organisations and, sometimes, international law.
These developments continue to gather pace. We are only
witnessing the opening phase of them. But we were privileged,
in effect, to be there at the creation.
POLICING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
One of the most remarkable developments of international
law in recent decades has been the growing impact of international
human rights treaties on municipal law and practice. I have
observed this at three levels. I want to mention each.
The Special
Rapporteurs and Special Representatives
Between 1993 and 1996 I served as Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for Human Rights in Cambodia.
That function arose in the aftermath of the successful completion
of the UNTAC phase, as a requirement agreed between Cambodia and
members of the international community and given effect in the
Paris Peace Accords.
Twice a year, in Geneva in April and in New York in November,
it was my duty to report on the state of human rights in Cambodia
to the Commission on Human Rights and to the General Assembly.
I was one of about thirty United Nations Special Representatives
and Special Rapporteurs. I saw at first-hand the operations
of the Centre for Human Rights. I worked closely with the
High Commissioner for Human Rights. The criteria for my
visits and reports were not intuitive beliefs of my own about
civilised standards. They were the principles laid down
in the international treaties which together establish the basic
framework of international human rights law.
Despite various difficulties, I have no doubt that my work
and that of the United Nations Office of Human Rights in Cambodia,
stimulated, cajoled and encouraged domestic law and practice in
that country to conform with the international treaty obligations
which Cambodia increasingly accepted. In a land that had
been racked by revolution, war, genocide and invasion, there was
a deep thirst for guidance and support. I wish that time
permitted me to tell you of the noble servants of the United Nations
with whom I worked during those years. Of "Shorty"
Coleman, an Australian soldier supervising landmine clearance.
Of Christoph Peschoux, human rights officer, who investigated
dangerous cases of abuse of power. Of Basil Fernando, who
instituted programmes for training prison officers and police.
Of Ms Kek Galebru who helped establish non-governmental organisations
to assert and uphold the rights of women.
Let no one say that the United Nations is made up of time
servers. I have seen with my own eyes the dedicated and
idealistic servants of international human rights law, often working
in most trying and even dangerous situations. That work
goes on. Many of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations
have suffered retaliation for their actions, including the Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary (Dato' Param Cumaraswamy)
whose case was recently taken to the International Court of Justice.
The bureaucracy of the United Nations is often trying. The
frustrations and rejections are sometimes dispiriting. But
let no one say that it is all talk. At least in the case
of Cambodia, there was action. Even for more oppressive
nation states, it is a salutary requirement of international institutions
and practice today that the autocrats and their representatives
must come before the bar of the United Nations and answer to charges
of infractions of international human rights law. There
is progress in that fact alone.
The ICCPR First
Optional Protocol
My second illustration brings little credit on me.
Soon after it was announced that Australia would sign the First
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (thereby rendering itself accountable
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the communication
of an individual), I was asked whether the gay and lesbian reform
group in Tasmania should mount a complaint to the United Nations
concerning the Tasmanian criminal laws against adult homosexual
conduct between males.
I am ashamed to say that I advised against such a communication.
The intended complainant, Nicholas Toonen, had not been charged
with an offence under the Tasmanian laws. He had not exhausted
domestic remedies because no domestic process had been taken against
him. I told him that his complaint was doomed to fail.
In fact, the Human Rights Committee upheld Mr Toonen's complaint
against Australia.
In the ultimate result, the Australian Federal Parliament enacted
a statute over-riding the Tasmanian laws.
Those laws were repealed and replaced by the non-discriminatory
provisions now in force. Now, nowhere in Australia is there
any law imposing criminal sanctions on people for adult private
sexual conduct, although there are still serious inconsistencies
in the treatment of who is an adult for this purpose.
The lessons of the Toonen Case are many.
For my immediate purposes, they show once again the practical
operation of international human rights law, at least in a country
such as Australia which has signed the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR and is a good international citizen. As we
do not have a general constitutional Bill of Rights in Australia
and as there is no regional human rights court or commission for
Asia or the Pacific, the importance of the ICCPR could not be
over-stated. Indeed, the significance of the Toonen decision
runs far from Tasmania and Australia which, ultimately, would
have corrected their legal aberration on homosexual offences.
It brings hope to people in countries where individuals are still
oppressed by reason of their sexuality.
Because I am homosexual myself, I understand that oppression;
indeed it helps me to understand all oppressions based on irrational
and irrelevant grounds. I applaud the fact that two Australians,
Nicholas Toonen and Rodney Croome, politely ignored my advice
and pressed on with their communication, invoking international
law. They teach once again, as Martin Luther King Jr and
other leaders of the American freedom movement did, the importance
of courage and obstinate adherence to principle in the face of
apparent difficulties.
I do not pretend that the Toonen decision, and its
reasoning, has passed without criticism in Australia or elsewhere.
For example, some have seen it as an unwarranted and premature
intrusion into Australia's domestic concerns and federal arrangements.
Some of the other view have considered that it did not go far
enough. Thus, it has been suggested that it is fundamentally
erroneous to rest the human rights response to oppression on the
ground of sexuality on notions of privacy rather than on notions
of full equality. This has been seen, by some observers,
as little more than the "freedom" of a closeted human
identity and one which tolerates the very public violence and
discrimination suffered by many homosexual citizens when they
move out of the privacy of the kind that ICCPR protects.
If one were to look to the growth areas for the application
of fresh thinking about international human rights norms in the
decades immediately ahead, they would, I suggest, include two.
One would be sexuality. Already essays are appearing on
whether the right to same-sex marriages, for example, can be derived
from international law.
One judge of Australia's highest court has suggested that the
"marriage power" appearing in the Australian Constitution,
although originally denoting only marriage between a man and a
woman for life may, in today's society, be read more broadly to
include a federal legislative power to enact laws with respect
to same-sex unions.
Having the constitutional power is one thing. Having the
political will is, of course, another.
The second growth area is surely in the field of drug use
and drug dependence. I suspect that in twenty years we will
look back on the current municipal and international response
to the problems presented by drugs of addiction with something
like the shame that now attends, or ought to attend, the way municipal
law dealt (and in some places, including in the United States,
still deals) with human sexuality.
Bangalore Principles on Domestic
Application of International Law
A most important development has occurred in Australia
in the use that is being made of international human rights norms.
It is a development new in a country which has hitherto adhered
strictly to the "dualist" notion: that the norms
of international law do not become part of the domestic law unless
made so by the municipal lawmaker.
The development to which I refer is sometimes described by reference
to the Bangalore Principles.
These were adopted at a conference mainly attended by Commonwealth
judges in Bangalore, India in 1988. The only "outsider"
was Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then on the eve of her appointment to
the United States Supreme Court. The Bangalore Principles
acknowledge the dualist rule. International law is not in
most countries, as such, part of domestic law. But in respect
of international human rights norms, the Bangalore Principles
accept that judges of the common law tradition may properly utilise
such international rules in construing an ambiguous statute or
in filling the gaps in the precedents of the common law.
In a former judicial post, I frequently invoked the Bangalore
Principles, sometimes with, and sometimes without, the support
of judicial colleagues.
An important breakthrough occurred in Australian thinking on this
subject in the Mabo decision which, for the first time,
upheld the rights of indigenous peoples in Australia to title
in land with which they could prove long association.
One strand in the reasoning which led the majority of the High
Court of Australia to reversing past judicial holdings and upholding
that claim, was the serious breach that would otherwise arise
in respect of Australia's international human rights obligations.
Justice F G Brennan, who wrote the leading opinion in the Mabo
Case,
said:
"The common law does not
necessarily conform with international law, but international
law is a legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law, especially when international law declares
the existence of universal human rights. A common law
doctrine founded in unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of
civil and political rights demands reconsideration. It
is contrary both to international standards and to the fundamental
values of our common law to entrench a discriminatory rule".
The Court in Mabo acknowledged the impact which "the
powerful influence of the Covenant" would increasingly come
to play upon Australia's common law. This appreciation obliges
a shift in the understanding of the dualist principle. In
the past, it has ordinarily been voiced in terms that municipal
law must await incorporation of international law by the municipal
legislature. Now, in a common law country, it should, I
think, be accepted that the judiciary also has a role, albeit
in the minor key, to shape, express and develop the law.
In the exercise of that role, the judiciary of the common law
tradition may, in appropriate cases, play a part in moulding the
common law to universal principles expressed in international
human rights law. In doing so, they should not simply incorporate
a treaty holus bolus "by the back door".
However, the legitimate role of judicial elaboration using international
law as an influence upon municipal common law is now increasingly
understood and decreasingly controversial. This process
will, I have no doubt, continue to gather pace.
In my reasons in a couple of decisions in the High Court of Australia,
I have suggested that the Bangalore Principles might be appropriate
for incorporation into reasoning about the meaning of the Australian
Constitution itself.
I have suggested that the Court "should adopt the meaning
which conforms to the principles of universal and fundamental
rights rather than an interpretation that it would involve a departure
from such rights".
In elaborating this view I have suggested:
"Where there is ambiguity,
there is a strong presumption that the Constitution, adopted
and accepted by the people of Australia for their government,
is not intended to violate fundamental human rights and human
dignity ... The Australian Constitution ... speaks to the people
of Australia. But it also speaks to the international
community as the basic law of the Australian nation which is
a member of that community".
I believe that in due course
this opinion will be vindicated. The rapprochement
between municipal laws (including constitutional laws) and international
law will gather pace as the twenty-first century progresses.
It has to be acknowledged that views of the kind which I have
mentioned have attracted criticisms, especially from those who
adhere to the "originalist" school of constitutional
interpretation,
which I regard this as a form of legal ancestor worship.
Two other Australian developments should also be stated.
One is the introduction of a Bill designed to overcome a decision
of the High Court and to render, as part of Australian federal
law, the rule that "entering into an international treaty
is not reason for raising any expectation that government decision-making
will act in accordance with the treaty if the relevant provisions
of the treaty have not been enacted into domestic law".
The second development is the institution by the Australian government
of a review of Australia's participation in six United Nations
committees which oversee human rights treaties.
This review has followed, in point of time, criticism of Australia
in the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
in respect inter alia of mandatory sentencing laws that
were partly copied from the United States. The work of the
United Nations human rights committees has been defended by the
President of the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission.
The outcome of the review is not yet known.
So far as domestic application of international law by the judges
is concerned, Hilary Charlesworth has said, accurately I believe,
that the suggested "threat of international law to the Australian
legal system is much exaggerated".
She has described the highest court as being "very cautious
in its embrace of international law; it has kept its gloves and
hat on at all times".
If, occasionally, I have lifted my hat to pay passing respect
to international law it is (I hope you will understand) because
my experience over twenty years has brought me into close familiarity
with the operations of international law and international institutions
- especially in the field of human rights. That operation
is by no means alien to lawyers of the Anglo-American tradition.
The influence of such lawyers upon the texts and jurisprudence,
from the beginnings of Mrs Roosevelt's Universal Declaration
of Human Rights up to the present time, has been profound.
In a sense, as Judge Buergenthal said in 1997:
"It is ironic that western
countries which have a cultural and geopolitical interest in
global respect for human rights, have lately come to apply brakes
to the domestic application of international norms. By
way of contrast, some States which have suffered from past dictatorial
regimes have played an important role in encouraging the adoption
of domestic constitutional mechanisms that strengthen the power
of the independent judiciary to enforce international human
rights guarantees in conflict with national law and to implement
the rulings of international tribunals".
CONCLUSIONS
In these remarks I have concentrated mainly on the international
law of human rights. But no sitting of the High Court of
Australia now passes without some relevant international legal
principle being invoked as an aspect of a domestic legal problem.
Many cases come before the Court concerning the Refugees Convention
which, in Australia, has been incorporated into municipal law
in respect of the definition of "refugees".
Beyond this, important questions are regularly presented to the
courts concerning extradition law,
the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction,
the international intellectual property protection regimes,
various conventions of the International Labor Organisation to
which Australia is a party,
the Hague Rules and the Brussels Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
and the Closer Economic Relations Treaty between Australia
and New Zealand.
Most of these cases are collected each year by Professor Donald
Rothwell in the splendid Year Book of International Law produced
by the Australian and New Zealand Society. Each year this
chapter grows larger.
Even if municipal judges today in countries such as Australia,
New Zealand and the United States were personally disinclined
to lift their eyes to the burgeoning growth of international law,
their ordinary judicial duties will increasingly confront them
with the realities that come with global transport, interactive
technology and international problems. International law
is no longer a realm of princes, diplomats and nations.
The global economy and the global village have brought international
law into the courtrooms at every level.
These developments will continue and indeed will gather pace.
They will require greater imagination and open-mindedness on the
part of judges and lawyers. The element of parochial self-satisfaction
and the sense of superiority has never been far from the legal
traditions of the common law. Now lawyers of that tradition
must live in the reality of a world in which international law
has a very large and growing part to play.
That is why this conference is both symbolic and timely.
It is symbolic because it brings some of the most distinguished
lawyers from the northern hemisphere to Australasia to share insights
and understanding. Australia and New Zealand are good international
citizens. They have a fine tradition of intellectual participation
in the field of international law. This conference is timely
because, as I have demonstrated, many things are happening in
this part of the world to render international law of great relevance.
We are the lucky ones. We have the chance to witness, and
to contribute to, changes of the most profound legal significance.
Let future generations say of international law at this moment
that it was blessed with creative intellects who saw the tectonic
shift occurring and recognised what they saw.