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Speeches
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION ON GENERAL PRACTICE
25TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE
BOSTON, USA, 2 JUNE 1999
JOINT SESSION COMMITTEES 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17 & 19
EDUCATING THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN HUMAN RIGHTS -
PRACTICAL OR PIE IN THE SKY?
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG*
A PRACTICAL SETTING
In December 1998, I participated in a celebration at Harvard University
of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1.
One of the foremost educators of the legal profession in human rights,
Professor Henry Steiner of the Harvard Law School, generously presented
me with copy of his book, written with the Australian Professor Philip
Alston. The book is International Human Rights in Context2.
The authors' preface begins with the reminder that3:
- "As little as two decades ago, rare was the university whose
curriculum included human rights studies. Much has changed, to
the point where one no longer questions why such studies should
be offered but rather how they could be ignored. The human rights
movement [including] governmental as well as non-governmental
developments in human rights since 1945 - grew out of the disasters
of World War II. A mere half century later human rights ideals
deeply inform both the practise and theory of international law
and politics".
My thesis is that the human rights movement is also having a profound,
growing and beneficial impact upon domestic law and upon the professional
activities of practising lawyers. The International Bar Association
and its Section on Legal Practice, in a quarter century of outstanding
initiatives, plays a large and growing role in encouraging this development.
The establishment of the Human Rights Institute, its many world-wide
initiatives including the recent publication of the basic texts on
international human rights4,
are some of the most important activities which lawyers around the
world are now taking in recognition of their professional obligation
to practise human rights at home and to support human rights where
they are endangered in every corner of the world.
A lawyer may have the right inclinations and even the intellectual
conviction that initiatives of this kind should be taken. But without
the basic source materials, he or she will make little progress.
Without the support of a professional culture in which defence of
fundamental human rights is seen as legally orthodox, respectable
and professional, lawyers may lack the courage to advance their
submissions and to conduct their cases with reference to the setting
of global human rights.
That global setting is actually very practical. It has no time
for pie in the sky. This message is brought home powerfully in the
first chapter of the book by Steiner and Alston. That chapter is
called "Global Snapshots". It is designed to demonstrate that challenges
to human rights of ordinary human beings are part of the contemporary
reality of the world we live in. They are not theoretical things
of interest only to academic lawyers and misty-eyed dreamers who
join idealistic fellow travellers in non governmental organisations
devoted to starry-eyed ideals. Amongst the "snapshots" are reports
of:
- The Special UN Rapporteur on Iraq's account of officially sanctioned
amputations, maiming and branding of dissidents and military deserters
in Iraq5.
- Of the denial of basic workers' rights to union membership
of their choice under the Suharto regime in Indonesia6.
- Of the banning and confiscation in Turkey of a book by the
nation's best known novelist because of a contribution he had
made to a foreign magazine describing the oppression of fellow
Kurds7.
- Of the proud boast of a Singapore Minister of the receipt
of hundreds of letters and phone calls from the United States
supporting corporal punishment by Singapore of an 18 year old
American, beaten with a rattan, after conviction for car vandalisation8.
- Of the persisting practice of dowry demands on women in India9.
- Of the Kenya Government's crack-down on the opposition, the
press and the Legal Aid Centre which was fire bombed in 1995 after
it published a report implicating a presidential adviser in murder10.
And lest it be thought that these instances have nothing to do with
the countries of lawyers who have enough money to attend big international
conferences, Steiner and Alston call to notice serious and continuing
wrongs in Western countries:
- In the United States economic inequality has been on the rise
since the 1970s. Especially since tax cuts in the 1980s, the gap
between the rich and the poor has widened11.
The authors might have added reference to the continuing disadvantages
suffered by ethnic minorities reflected in the high proportion
of African Americans in prisons and exposed to HIV. Or the lack
of an adequate national and comprehensive healthcare system, astonishing
in one of the wealthiest countries on earth.
- In Britain the age of consent for sex between homosexual
men is 21, much higher than anywhere else in the European Union
where it is usually 16 or below12.
- In Israel, the government has continued a policy of demolishing
or sealing houses on the West Bank in response to Palestinian
resistance to Israeli military occupation13.
- Out of Serbia, long before the present crisis in Kosovo, have
come horror stories of the plight of survivors of Serb run concentration
camps - of prisoners who were made to watch all manner of cruelties:
fathers forced to have oral sex with their sons; women raped in
front of their husbands and sons; people quartered after their
limbs were tied to cars that drove off in different directions;
others with their fourth and fifth fingers cut off at the knuckle,
leaving the remaining fingers fixed in the traditional two fingered
salute of Serbian nationalism14.
Lawyers need to be in the forefront of international and local efforts
to respond to these affronts to fundamental human rights, wherever
they occur. Often, lawyers are there, working in courtroom and offices,
in legal aid and pro bono activities, in NGOs, Bar Associations, in
legislatures, in the United Nations, at international conferences,
on the Bench and in their ordinary lives. Although it is not universally
true, it is sufficiently often the fact that it can be said that many
lawyers were first attracted to a life in the law by the law's basic
commitment to the ideal of equal justice for all. It is justice according
to law, that is true. That is what the rule of law means. But it is
the business of lawyers to strive for justice and to work to ensure
that, wherever possible, there is harmony between the rules of law
and the needs of justice. It is the quest for justice, which includes
the defence of fundamental human rights, that gives the legal profession,
the practice of law and the judicial vocation their claims to nobility.
THE GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
Most countries of the world either include in their written constitutions
a charter of basic human rights or (like New Zealand15and
lately the United Kingdom16),
have a statute-based bill of rights to be used in construing other
legislation and otherwise in advancing protection of fundamental human
rights. Australia is now one of the few countries which has neither
of these systems, although, as a matter of practicality, there is
a high level of human rights respect, protected by specific legislation,
judicial decisions and constitutional interpretation17.
Every lawyer, in his or her own jurisdiction, will be generally familiar
with these legal rules. In appropriate cases, they may be invoked
to protect a client's rights and thereby to defend human rights more
generally.
Apart from the proliferation of newly minted national constitutions,
in newly independent States emerging from colonialism, a distinct
feature of the past fifty years has been the establishment, and
growing influence, of regional bodies protecting human rights18and
of international institutions which play a part in the implementation
of global human rights standards and the elaboration of international
human rights jurisprudence.
The European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights are the most notable of the regional bodies. In
February 1998, African Ministers, meeting under the auspices of
the Organisation of African Unity endorsed the text of a protocol
for the creation of an African Court of Human and People's Rights19.
Only my own region of the world, Asia and the Pacific, has proved
recalcitrant in the face of this global movement.
So far as the international institutions for the defence of fundamental
rights are concerned three stand out. The first is the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations, established under the First Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). The second is the Commission on Human Rights,
established under ECOSOC, to consider human rights issues and receive
reports on human rights concerns. The third institution comprises
the Special Rapporteurs and Special Representatives, appointed by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations or elected by the Commission
on Human Rights. Some of these officials investigate and report
upon thematic subjects (as does the Special Rapporteur on the Independence
of the Judiciary or on the Rights of Women or on Children's Rights).
Others report on human rights concerns in particular countries.
For a time20,
I served as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations for Human Rights in Cambodia. In that capacity, I
reported to the United Nations twice yearly: in April in Geneva
to the Commission on Human Rights and in November in New York to
the General Assembly. The members of the Human Rights Committee
and virtually all of the Special Representatives and Rapporteurs
are lawyers. Skills in legal analysis, in sifting facts, expounding
the applicable rules, finding infractions and in presenting observations
about unacceptable practices and procedures explain why lawyers
dominate these fields of endeavour. In reports of this kind, on
these topics, they have special skills.
As a result of the case decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, countries found in breach of their obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights are obliged to bring their laws
into conformity. So indeed they do. In 1989 in Norris v Ireland21,
the European Court of Human Rights, following an earlier like decision
in Dudgeon v United Kingdom22,
found that Senator Norris, by being exposed to penalties under Irish
criminal law rendering him liable to punishment for consensual adult
homosexual conduct in private23,
had suffered a violation of his rights to respect for his private
life. As a consequence, Ireland in 1993 reformed its criminal law.
It abolished the old offences and set a non-discriminatory age (17)
for lawful sexual conduct of whatever sexuality. Not pie in the
sky. Practical human rights achievements secured, in large part,
by political agitation, community activism and good lawyering. One
of Senator Norris's counsel was Mrs Mary Robinson SC, later President
of the Irish Republic and now the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights.
Australia is not a party to the European Convention. There is no
applicable regional treaty. But Australia did subscribe in 1993
to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. This action led to
a prompt complaint against Australia to the Human Rights Committee.
It was brought by Mr Nicholas Toonen. He, and Mr Rodney Croome,
were homosexual citizens of Australia living in Tasmania. That was
the last Australian State to preserve laws criminalising adult consensual
private homosexual conduct. With the aid of lawyers, the Toonen/Croome
complaint was prosecuted before the Committee which found in their
favour24.
The Committee rejected the suggestion that moral issues were exclusively
a matter of domestic concern25.
It stated that if this were so it would "open the door to withdrawing
from the Committee's scrutiny a potentially large number of statutes
interfering with privacy". It concluded that the provisions of the
then Tasmanian law26,
which the Parliament of Tasmania had failed to repeal, arbitrarily
interfered with Mr Toonen's right to privacy under Article 17.1
of the ICCPR. The Committee called for a prompt report of action
from the State party (Australia) as to the measures taken to give
effect to its views27.
The Australian Federal Parliament did not enjoy general constitutional
power to enact laws with respect to crime in the State of Tasmania.
But it did enact the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994
(Aust). This provided that "sexual conduct involving only consenting
adults acting in private is not to be subject, by or under any law
to any arbitrary interference with privacy within the meaning of
Article 1 of the [ICCPR]". The Act defined an adult as a person
who is 18 years old or more. The legislation, and the Human Rights
Committee, were criticised from many angles by Australian commentators28.
Further litigation ensued to test the State legislation in the light
of the operation of the federal Act. In the wake of this, the Tasmanian
Parliament ultimately repealed the old laws. Lawyers and lawyer-led
civil liberties organisations prosecuted and led the challenges
in the courts to the Tasmanian legislation29.
With the help of good lawyering, unimportant changes were achieved
in the legislation and, perhaps even more importantly, in community
attitudes. Not pie in the sky. Practical human rights protection.
In the United Kingdom, there have been many cases in the courts
in recent years, calling on the principles in the European Convention
and on the decisions on the ICCPR, designed to effect and secure
decisions of the common law or of statutory interpretation in harmony
with fundamental human rights. The issues considered have ranged
from those related to the discharge of military personnel on the
grounds of their sexual orientation30,
the construction of prison rules relating to correspondence between
a prisoner and his solicitor31;
the public disclosure by police of names and addresses of persons
who have been convicted of sexual offences against minors32;
the entitlement of criminal accused to confront witnesses giving
evidence against them33;
the rules governing mandatory life sentences of imprisonment34;
and laws impinging upon legitimate freedom of expression35.
Fifty years ago, in England, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt,
described the European Convention of Human Rights as a "half-baked
scheme" which was "administered by some unknown court"36.
With the recent moves to incorporate the Convention into the domestic
law of the United Kingdom37it
will fall to United Kingdom lawyers and United Kingdom judges in
the first instance, to give meaning to fundamental human rights.
They will be obliged to approach the Convention as a "living instrument"
to be "interpreted in the light of present day conditions"38.
This is an exciting moment for the law of the United Kingdom and
a big challenge for its judges and lawyers. One of them has expressed
quite bluntly the need for a radical change to the approach to statutory
interpretation; another to the need for a change of the legal culture39.
A similar resort to international law, including in the context
of fundamental human rights, has been occurring in the New Zealand
courts40.
Even in the United States of America, the last bastion of perceived
human rights self-sufficiency (with the developed jurisprudence
of the Bill of Rights now two centuries old) has begun to feel the
growing influence of international human rights law. On 12 December
1998, the United States Supreme Court issued a stay order for the
execution for Joseph Stanley Faulder, less than 30 minutes before
he was scheduled to die by lethal injection in Texas. The prisoner
had been on death row for 21 years following the brutal killing
of an old woman, an act which he never denied. The point in issue
is that Mr Faulder was a Canadian citizen. This was something he
had not mentioned to Texas officials at the time of his arrest.
After many other legal arguments were found to be without merit,
Mr Faulder's lawyers argued that his conviction had violated the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . This obliges signatory
States, such as the United States, when they arrest a foreign national
for a serious crime, to notify the nearest consulate of the national's
home country. Canadian officials were not notified of the case until
1991.
The Supreme Court's intervention in the Faulder case was noteworthy
because, earlier in the same year, lawyers for a Paraguayan national
(Angel Breard) appealing against his death sentence in Virginia,
persuaded the government of Paraguay to file a claim against the
United States in the International Court of Justice. That claim
was based on the failure of the Virginian officials to notify the
Paraguayan consular officers before or at the time of the trial
of Mr Breard. The International Court asked that the execution be
postponed whilst the matter was considered. Secretary of State Albright
pleaded for the State of Virginia to do so out of respect for international
law. Virginia refused. The United States Supreme Court declined
a last minute request for its intervention. Yet in Mr Faulder's
case, the Court ordered that his execution should be postponed to
permit time for the issues to be considered.
A commentator on these cases remarks41:
- "At the beginning of 1998, a UN Special Rapporteur issued a
report condemning the United States for racist and abusive applications
of the death penalty An Amnesty Report on human rights abuses
in the United States, issued in 1998, devotes an entire chapter
to abuses on the death penalty which it asserts be contrary to
international law. The United States has been a hold out against
many sorts of grand international ventures in this century - from
the League of Nations to the Law of the Sea Treaty, from the Children's
Rights Convention to the International Criminal Court. This is
not a world that any of the American Founders looked back on with
nostalgia. But it seems to appeal very much to the champions of
global civil society. It remains unclear whether the Constitution
can still keep the United States from joining it".
THE BANGALORE MOVEMENT
An important movement which has been occurring in the courts of domestic
jurisdiction in many countries of the common law needs to be mentioned
in this context. I refer to the movement which has grown out of a
series of conferences amongst leading judges of common law countries.
This series has been sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat in
London and by Interights, the International Centre for the Legal Protection
of Human Rights also based in London. The first meeting in the series
was held in 1988 in Bangalore, India.
I attended the first Bangalore meeting, as did the Honorable Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. Neither of us was at that time a member of the ultimate
court of our country. I went to the meeting with the usual predilections
of a lawyer brought up in the dualist school which upholds a strict
divorce between domestic and international law42.
The meeting adopted the Bangalore Principles43.
According to these principles44:
- "There is a growing tendency for national courts to have regard
to these international norms [of human rights] for the purpose
of citing cases where the domestic law whether constitutional,
statute or common law - is uncertain or incomplete. It is within
the proper nature of the judicial process and well established
judicial functions for national courts to have regard to international
obligations which a country undertakes - whether or not they have
been incorporated into domestic law - for the purpose of removing
ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation
or common law".
When I returned to Australia, convinced that the Bangalore Principles
provided a means of helping to reconcile the growing body of international
human rights law and domestic law, I was met with scepticism on the
part of most members of the legal profession. I faced a view on the
part of some of my judicial colleagues that I was indulging in legal
heresy45.
So it remained for a time. But in one of the most important decisions
of Australia's highest court in recent years, in which the land rights
of the indigenous Aboriginal peoples were recognised for the first
time under the common law, Justice F G Brennan (later Chief Justice
of Australia) perceptively acknowledged and explained the growing
influence which international law in the field of human rights would
inevitably have on the development of Australia's domestic common
law46:
- "Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing
to recognise the rights and interests in land of the indigenous
inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory
doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted. The expectations
of the international community accord in this respect with the
contemporary values of the Australian people. The opening up of
international remedies to individuals pursuant to Australia's
accession to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, brings to bear on the common
law the powerful influence of the Covenant and the international
standards it imports. The common law does not necessarily conform
with international law, but international law is a legitimate
and important influence on the development of the common law,
especially when international law declares the existence of universal
human rights. A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination
in the enjoyment of civil and political rights demands reconsideration".
Although this is probably the clearest statement in an ultimate court
of the Commonwealth of Nations of the way in which (as the Bangalore
Principles had taught) international human rights law will increasingly
come to influence domestic judicial decisions, there are other like
statements in several other countries. These include the United Kingdom47,
New Zealand48and
later decisions of Australia49.
This is not to say that, especially in federal countries where
power is divided and in societies where the Executive subscribes
to treaties which may or may not have legislative backing, care
must not be taken to respect the separate constitutional law-making
roles of the several actors in the law-making drama. But there can
be little doubt that the process set in train by the Bangalore
Principles will continue to have its impact on the legal systems
of the world, especially those which follow the common law methodology.
In my own Court, in a case concerning the law on compulsory acquisition
of property by federal authorities50and
another case concerning the race power51,
I have suggested that constitutional interpretation will also, in
contemporary conditions, legitimately embrace the Bangalore approach52:
- "Where the Constitution is ambiguous, this Court should adopt
that meaning which conforms to the principles of fundamental rights
rather than an interpretation which would involve a departure
from such rights. Australian law, including its constitutional
law, may sometimes fall short of giving effect to fundamental
rights. The duty of the Court is to interpret what the Constitution
says and not what individual judges may think it should have said.
If the Constitution is clear, the Court must give effect to its
terms. Nor should the Court adopt an interpretive principle as
a means of introducing, by the back door, provisions in international
treaties or other international law concerning fundamental rights
not yet incorporated into Australian domestic law. However, the
inter-relationship of national and international law, including
in relation to fundamental rights, is 'undergoing evolution' [I]nternational
law is a legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law and constitutional law, especially where international
law declares the existence of universal and fundamental rights.
To the full extent that its text permits, Australia's Constitution,
as the fundamental law of government accommodates itself to international
law, including in so far as that law expresses basic rights".
More recently, I put it this way53:
- "[T]he Australian Constitution which is a special statute,
does not operate in a vacuum. It speaks to the people of Australia.
But it also speaks to the international community as the basic
law of the Australian nation which is a member of that community.
If there is one subject upon which the international law of fundamental
rights resonates with a single voice it is the prohibition of
detrimental distinctions on the basis of race".
Many and varied have been the instances where the international norms
of fundamental human rights, and the jurisprudence which has gathered
around those norms, have been invoked in court decisions in Australia
involving ambiguities in legislation or gaps in the settled principles
of the common law. Judges and lawyers now have a new source of intellectual
stimulation to nudge our municipal law in a direction which conforms
to fundamental human rights. This is a movement wholly in keeping
with the forces of globalism and regionalism that are at work at an
economic level and in technology. The question is whether the law
and its practitioners will be exempt. It seems unlikely.
The Bangalore Principles, when first formulated, recognised
that the whole burden of this change of thinking cannot be left
to the judiciary alone. Sometimes individual members of the judiciary,
or even perhaps a majority of judges, may be resistant to new ideas
of this kind. It will depend upon lawyers in their advocacy to press
forward the universal norms. In 1988, the judges meeting in Bangalore
observed54:
- "It is essential to redress a situation where, by reason of
traditional legal training which has tended to ignore the international
dimension, judges and practising lawyers are often unaware of
the remarkable and comprehensive developments of statements of
international human rights norms. For the practical implementation
of these views it is desirable to make provision for appropriate
courses in universities and colleges, and for lawyers and law
enforcement officials, provision in libraries of relevant materials,
promotion of expert advisory bodies knowledgeable about developments
in the field; better dissemination of information to judges, lawyers
and law enforcement officials; and meetings for exchanges of relevant
information and experience".
In pursuance of these objectives, the IBA, the Commonwealth Secretariat,
Interights, the International Commission of Jurists and other bodies
have been assiduous in promoting knowledge of the Bangalore movement
and its lessons. The meeting of 1988 has been followed by a succession
of similar meetings55.
The most recent such meeting, held in Bangalore in December 1998,
reviewed the progress which had been made. A key provision in the
1998 statement repeats the fundamental idea of the series56:
- "It is the vital duty of an independent, impartial and well-qualified
judiciary, assisted by an independent, well-trained legal profession,
to interpret and apply national constitutions and ordinary legislation
in harmony with international human rights codes and customary
international law, and to develop the common law in the light
of the values and principles enshrined in international human
rights law".
One point made in the 1998 statement needs to be brought home to practising
lawyers. It is the indivisible inter-relationship of economic, social
and cultural rights with the more familiar categories of civil and
political rights that lawyers know well57.
A glance at the large number and wide variety of cases throughout
the world where courts have been persuaded to adopt the approach of
the Bangalore Principles should reinforce practising lawyers
in every jurisdiction in a determination to enter the new millennium
with a new legal principle that will help their legal systems to a
more harmonious relationship with international human rights law58.
This is an exciting change. It requires a leap of imagination and
a new way of thinking on the part of the judiciary and lawyers. It
needs a new legal and judicial culture. There is no doubt that this
will occur in every jurisdiction in the coming century. But in every
jurisdiction there is a need for judges and lawyers who will act as
change agents as the old dualist thinking is modified and new approaches
are taken which acknowledge the growing impact of international human
rights norms on domestic law. The tide is coming in. It cannot be
reversed.
OTHER WAYS OF ACTING
So far I have been concerned to describe the way that lawyers in court
rooms may influence decisions by helping to ensure that they conform
to human rights standards. Not every case will present a human rights
question. Not every case which does so will permit of a solution that
conforms to the applicable international jurisprudence. The law may
be clear. Constitutional doctrine may be settled. The legislation
may be unambiguous. The precedents of common law may be unarguable
and binding. Judges and lawyers must then apply the law even though
it may be inconsistent with international human rights norms.
But lawyers, including judges, are not confined to the courtroom.
Most legal problems never end in a contested trial. That still leaves
a great mass of lawyerly activity to be influenced by human rights
principles and attitudes. Attitudes of respect to the dignity of
clients, including prisoners, to opponents and to the clients of
opponents. Attitudes of respect to other human beings outside the
legal office. Respect for legal colleagues and court officials.
Lawyers can contribute to the advance of human rights, and community
education in human rights, by involving themselves in civil society
organisations. This includes involvement in bodies of lawyers such
as the IBA, the ICJ, the International Lawyers' Group and so on.
And bodies which lawyers have helped to found and to flourish, such
as Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch organisations,
the United Nations Associations and so forth. It may be that judges
have to be more careful in participating in such organisations,
lest demands are made that they recuse themselves from participating
in cases for ostensible bias59.
However that may be, such limitations do not affect the practising
Bar. They should not affect most judges in most circumstances. It
has long been traditional and accepted for judges to be associated,
in proper ways, with bodies of lawyers and other citizens concerned
with human rights, judicial and professional independence and the
rule of law.
Lawyers can also play a part, through legal education, in promoting
the values of human rights and in teaching the next generation of
the way in which such rights can be secured in practice. The large
expansion of law courses on human rights topics, described by Professors
Steiner and Alston, give rise to opportunities which academic and
practising lawyers should seize. Similarly, many opportunities present
themselves for lawyers to take part at some stage in their careers,
in the international activities of the United Nations and its agencies
or in regional bodies with like concerns. Where such opportunities
arise, lawyers with relevant skills should respond affirmatively.
Many do.
When, at home, the fundamental rights of individuals are breached,
it is the duty of lawyers to lift their voices. And they should
always remain alert to the fact that the catalogue of human rights
is not closed. When I was a young lawyer, few indeed were those,
including in the legal profession, who spoke up for the fundamental
rights of women, of people of colour, of Asians and of Aboriginal
Australians. Absolutely no one spoke up for the fundamental rights
of homosexual, bisexual and trans-gender people. We must learn from
these silences of the past to be alert to the contemporary issues
of human rights which, because of our mindset, we may not see clearly
enough. The human rights of people living with HIV/AIDS. The human
rights of people addicted to illegal drugs. The human rights of
drug dependant people, occasional small users and the families of
these citizens. The human rights of people with so-called "defective"
genes. The human rights of all to privacy in cyberspace.
It is the responsibility of every lawyer in today's world to keep
abreast of developments in human rights and of the challenges which
abuses of human rights present in every land. The IBA, its Section
on Legal Practice and its Human Rights Institute, provide practical
means of breathing life into the universal human rights principles
and upholding them in many and varied ways. I honour the IBA and
the Section on the Silver Anniversary. I acknowledge the Human Rights
Institute for its many achievements. The major challenges lie ahead.
| * |
- Justice of the High Court of Australia. Past President
of the International Commission of Jurists.
|
| 1 |
- See M D Kirby, "The Right to Health Fifty Years On -
Still Sceptical?" in 4 Health and Human Rights (1999)
(forthcoming).
|
| 2 |
- Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
|
| 3 |
- Ibid, v.
|
| 4 |
- International Bar Association, Human Rights and the
Administration of Justice - International Instruments (eds,
C Gane and M Mackarel), 1998. Reviewed Human Rights Institute
Newsletter, December 1998, 26-27; (1998) 72 Aust
LJ 970.
|
| 5 |
- H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights
in Context - Law, Politics, Morals, above n 2 at 4.
|
| 6 |
- Ibid, 5.
|
| 7 |
- Ibid, 6.
|
| 8 |
- Ibid, 10.
|
| 9 |
- Ibid, 11.
|
| 10 |
- Ibid, 13.
|
| 11 |
- Ibid, 13.
|
| 12 |
- Ibid, 15. Recent attempts at reform have been
blocked in the House of Lords.
|
| 13 |
- Ibid, 16.
|
| 14 |
- Ibid, 17.
|
| 15 |
- New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). See
eg J Burrows, "freedom of the Press under the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1900" in P A Joseph, Essays on
the Constitution, Broker, Wellington, 1995 at 286.
|
| 16 |
- Human Rights Act 1989 (UK). Cf J Cooper, "The
Human Rights Act 1988" (1999) 15 Amicus Curiae
8.
|
| 17 |
- A F Mason, "Closing Remarks", 50th Anniversary Conference
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10
December 1998, Sydney, Australia. The High Court of Australia
has found certain implications for free speech about political,
economic and like matters as a consequence of the character
of the representative democracy established by the Australian
Constitution. See Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times
Limited (1994) 182 CLR 104; Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 and Levy v Victoria
(1997) 189 CLR 579.
|
| 18 |
- Such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human
and People's Rights.
|
| 19 |
- See 9 African J Int'l and Comp L 953-961 (1997)
and note (1997) 11 Interights Bulletin 132.
|
| 20 |
- 1973-1976. Note the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice dated 29 April 1999 upholding the legal
immunity of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. The case was
referred to the Court on 5 August 19987 by ECOSOC after
Malaysian courts had expressed the conclusion that a certificate
by the UN Secretary-General was merely an opinion which
the courts could ignore. cf R Higgins, "The International
Court of Justice and Human Rights" in K Wellens (ed) International
Law and Practice , 1998, The Hague, 691.
|
| 21 |
- (1989) 13 EHRR 186.
|
| 22 |
- (1981) 4 EHRR 149.
|
| 23 |
- Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (Ir) s 11.
|
| 24 |
- Toonen v Australia 1 Int Hum Rts Reports 97
(No 3 1994), extracted in Steiner and Alston above n 2 at
545-548. See also A Funder, "The Toonen case" (1994)
5 Public Law Rev 156; G Selvanera, "Gays in Private:
The Problems with the Privacy Analysis in Furthering Human
Rights" (1994) 16 Adel L Rev 331; W Morgan, "Protecting
Rights or Just Passing the Buck" (1994) 1 Aust J Human
Rights 409. Another example affecting Australia concerned
the decision of the World Heritage Committee of UNESCO on
30 November 1998 to condemn the government of Australia
for allowing a uranium mine to operate in close proximity
to an Australian national park at Kakadu which had been
designated as a World Heritage Site. See J Rabkin, "International
Law vs. The American Constitution - Somethings Got to Give"
in the National Interest, 30 at 35-37 (Spring 1999).
|
| 25 |
- Toonen v Australia, above n 24 at par 8.6
|
| 26 |
- Criminal Code (Tas), ss 122, 123.
|
| 27 |
- Toonen v Australia, above n 24, par 12. The history
and significance of the Toonen decision is reviewed
in C F Stychin, "Relatively Universal: Globalisation, Rights
Discourse and the Evolution of Australian Sexual and National
Identities" (1998) 18 Legal Studies 534.
|
| 28 |
- Noted Steiner and Alston, above n 2, at 740-741.
|
| 29 |
- Croome v Tasman (1997) 191 CLR 119. It must be
said that neither Mr Toonen nor Mr Croome are lawyers. For
a more recent but unsuccessful challenge to discrimination
against homosexuals: see Grant v South-West Trains Ltd
[1998] All ER (EC) 193 where the European Court of Justice,
despite a strong recommendation of its Advocate-General,
dismissed a claim of work benefits discrimination. See L
R Helfer, "Grant v South-West Trains" 93 American Jl
Int'l Law 200 (1999).
|
| 30 |
- R v Ministry of Defence; Ex parte Smith [1996]
QB 517. This decision is noted by Sir Anthony Hooper, "The
Impact of the Human Rights Act on Judicial Decision-Making"
[1998] EHRLR (6) 676 at 678.
|
| 31 |
- Campbell v United Kingdom (1993) 15 EHRR 137,
noted Hooper, above n 30, at 679.
|
| 32 |
- R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police and Ors;
Ex parte AB and Anor [1997] 4 All ER 691; noted Hooper,
above n 30, at 680.
|
| 33 |
- R v Thomas, unreported, noted Hooper, above n
30, at 681.
|
| 34 |
- R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Hindley [1998] 2
WLR 505; noted Hooper, above n 30, at 681.
|
| 35 |
- The reference is to the Thalidomide case which led to
the Contempt of Court Act (see Hooper, above n 30,
at 681) and to Brind and Ors v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [1991] 1 AC 696; and Derbyshire
CC v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] QB 770 at 813 (followed
in Australia in Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994)
34 NSWLR 680). Cf Die Spoorbond v South African Railways
[1946] AD 999.
|
| 36 |
- Cited Hooper, above n 30, at 682.
|
| 37 |
- Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
|
| 38 |
- Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 at 10.
|
| 39 |
- Hooper, above n 30, at 683. See also M Hunt, "The Human
Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal
Profession" (1999) 26 Jl of Law & Society 86.
|
| 40 |
- K Keith, "The Impact of International Law on New Zealand
Law" (1998) 7 Waikato L Rev 1.
|
| 41 |
- See Rabkin, above n 24, at 39-41.
|
| 42 |
- R Higgins, Problems and Processes - International
Law and How we Use It, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994, 205.
|
| 43 |
- (1988) 14 Commonwealth L Bulletin 196; (1988)
62 Aust LJ 531.
|
| 44 |
- Ibid, par 7.
|
| 45 |
- cf Jago v District Court of NSW (1988) 12 NSWLR
558 at 580 per Samuels JA; Young v Registrar [No 3] (1993)
32 NSWLR 262 at 291-293 per Powell JA.
|
| 46 |
- Mabo v State of Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR
1 at 42.
|
| 47 |
- Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992]
1 QB 770.
|
| 48 |
- Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curran [1992]
3 NZLR 260; Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994]
2 NZLR 257. See note B O'Callaghan, " Tavita v Minister
for Immigration" (1994) 7 Auckland Uni L Rev 762
at 764.
|
| 49 |
- Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh
(1995) 183 CLR 273 at 288 per Mason CJ and Deane J.
|
| 50 |
- Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1997)
190 CLR 513 at 657 ("Interpretative principle").
|
| 51 |
- Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 72 ALJR 722
at 766.
|
| 52 |
- Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1997)
190 CLR 513 at 657 ("Interpretative principle").
|
| 53 |
- Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 72 ALJR 722
at 766.
|
| 54 |
- Bangalore Principle, No 9. See 62 Aust LJ at 532.
|
| 55 |
- Bangalore (1998); Harare (1989); Banjul (1990); Abuja
(1991); Balliol, Oxford (1992); Bloemfontein (1993); Georgetown
(1996); and Bangalore (1998).
|
| 56 |
- "The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical
Reality", unreported, Bangalore, 30 December 1998, par 3.
|
| 57 |
- Ibid, par 4.
|
| 58 |
- M D Kirby, "The Australian Use of International Human
Rights Norms: From Bangalore of Balliol - A View from the
Antipodes" (1993) 61 UNSWLJ 363; M D Kirby, "The
Impact of International Human Rights Norms: A Law Undergoing
Evolution" (1995) 25 Western Australian Law Rev 130.
See also A F Mason, "The Influence of International and
Trans-National Law on Australian Municipal Law" (1996) 7
Public Law Rev 20; J Crawford and W R Edeson, "International
Law and Australian Law" in A W Ryan (ed) International
Law in Australia, 2nd ed, 1984, 71 at 80-82.
|
| 59 |
- See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate,
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577.
|
|