AUSTRALIAN LAW
JOURNAL
BOOK REVIEW
HUMAN
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY
AUTHOR:
Michael Ignatieff
PUBLISHER:
Princeton University Press
EDITOR: Amy Gutmann.
Includes commentaries by four other authors and reply
by Ignatieff.
PRICE:
$US19.95
ISBN:
O-691-08893-4
The sight of Slobodan Milocevic in the dock before
the UN Tribunal in the Hague and of the Afghan prisoners
in cages at the US Naval Base in Cuba are metaphors for
the themes explored in this book.
How do we respond to the worst abuses of human rights? How do we render national leaders answerable before the bar of humanity?
How do we make the new global regime effective without
destroying the nation state upon which protections for human
rights have depended until now?
How do we also make rich and powerful countries accountable
for their human rights infringements?
Michael Ignatieff is described by one of the commentators
in this book as a person born in Canada, of Eastern European
ancestry, who teaches at Harvard University and lives in
London. Perhaps
such geographical ambivalence gives him a perspective of
global issues that a more hidebound author, tied to a particular
country, culture and religion, could not offer.
The book sets out Ignatieff's thoughts on human rights. These are contained in two chapters that respectively portray the
human rights discourse as politics and idolatry - the latter
an antidote to blind faith about the ultimate triumph of
human rights treaties. The chapters constitute Ignatieff's Tanner
Lectures for the Princeton Center for Human Values, given
in 2000. They are wrapped around with an extended introduction
by Amy Gutmann, who teaches politics at Princeton, and commentaries
by four distinguished American professors of law and politics.
The result is a kind of symposium in which six very
intelligent thinkers offer their insights into one of the
most dynamic forces of our time - the attempt to force a
paradigm shift in international law and politics from unaccountable
nations to a global system that renders nations and leaders
answerable for grave human rights abuses.
Ignatieff's appointment at Harvard involves teaching
human rights policy. He writes powerfully and simply, beginning
his first essay with a vivid image from one of Primo Levi's
books. Levi describes his encounter with a concentration
camp doctor who enjoyed unaccountable power to determine
whether he would live or die.
Starting with this arresting image, Ignatieff explains
that his concern is with the reality of human rights protection.
Yet much of this book is taken up with exploration
of unresolved theoretical questions upon which the author
and his commentators are extremely well qualified to offer
opinions.
One such question is why human rights should be respected
at all. What is the source of their moral force?
Some writers contend that it can only lie in a notion
that human beings have a "divine" spark attracting
a religious source for the imperative to protect rights. Secularists oppose this view. The then Soviet delegation vetoed the reference
to God in the draft preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. According to the alternative philosophy, the
human rights of others are respected
because we can see in others reflections of ourselves.
Just as this was one of the controversies that emerged
for Eleanor Roosevelt and her colleagues when the Universal
Declaration was being negotiated, so too, at that time,
the seeds of another controversy began to emerge.
The representatives of Saudi Arabia objected to provisions
relating to the rights of women and freedom of religion.
Ignatieff points out that the refusal of the Saudis
to accept the Universal Declaration afforded a portent
of the contemporary debates concerning the approach of fundamentalist
Islam (and other beliefs) to assertions of universal rights.
Other manifestations of relativism in human rights
discourse are explored. One of them, of special interest to Australians,
is the demand of some leaders in Malaysia, Singapore and
elsewhere for the "Asian model" of communitarian
values. Ignatieff is unsurprised by such demands.
Those whose power stems from "patriarchal"
authority, he explains, are unlikely to embrace enthusiastically
notions that tend to undermine their power.
Interwoven with these theoretical debates are some
very perceptive comments of a highly practical and political
kind. For example,
Ignatieff points to the close relationship between the collapse
of the Soviet Union and new pressures to impose human rights
requirements on states that were formerly left alone.
Thus he explains the revived interest of Western
countries in the right to self-determination for East Timor
as a product of the declining need to support Suharto's
regime in Indonesia as a bulwark against the spread of Chinese
Communist power. But
Ignatieff questions the wisdom of some of the West's current
posturing. He is especially sceptical about elevating
human rights concerns to the point that they undermine national
stability. For Ignatieff, the breakdown of law and order
and its replacement by chaos and violence is a most serious
threat to human rights.
It means that those with power (often majorities)
can freely oppress those without (usually minorities). He therefore assigns greater priority to constitutionalism
than to most human rights interventions.
Ignatieff does not mince his words over the double-standards
of Western countries seeking to impose their vision of human
rights on others. For example, he notes the criticisms made by the United States and
Britain of nations such as Turkey, for oppressing the educational
and linguistic rights of minorities, like the Kurds. But he points out that the same nations supply expensive military
equipment to oppressive regimes that enables them, in practice,
to stamp out the very rights that they are preaching.
Ignatieff saves up some of his harshest criticism
for the United States for what he sees as its refusal to
accept for itself the scrutiny by institutions conducted
by reference to global human rights standards.
The American psyche is well attuned to preaching
human rights and democracy to the world.
But when the world takes the United States to task
for human rights breaches in its prisons, in its enforcement
of capital punishment and its treatment of Afghan prisoners,
the reaction is one or resentment or indifference. For Americans, their Constitution is the last word on human rights.
All too often, it seems, global human rights are
only something needed by lesser races. The commentators pick up, and endorse, Ignatieff's
comments in this regard.
A measure of the resentment about such double-standards
can be seen in the fact that, in 2001, for the first time,
the United States was not elected to the UN Human Rights
Committee. If it
will not play the game according to the world's rules that
it largely helped to shape, the world, it seems, does not
want it on the governing board.
Some of Ignatieff's views are controversial, such
as his disenchantment with the right of peoples to self-determination
as stated in the UN treaties. He sees the grouping of "peoples"
in mini-states as potential vehicles for nationalist totalitarianism. In this, he is certainly right to point to
the risks and the need for constitutionalism and effective
judicial protection of minorities.
But no one looking at the map of the world today
could deny that most of the flashpoints for the acutest
dangers for peace and security arise from unfulfilled demands
for self-determination of distinct peoples.
In the wars and conflicts that such demands produce,
lie great dangers for life, prosperity and human rights.
Ignatieff's call for the strengthening of the state
so as to protect its citizens from chaos can only be accepted
with qualification, given that most of the worst affronts
to human rights in the last century, and not only in Western
countries, resulted from excessive state power.
The commentators pick up on Ignatieff's interesting
mixture of theoretical and practical analysis of his subject.
One makes the point that the responses of human rights
protest must vary according to the intended audience.
Quiet diplomacy with China might make some headway.
But with Turkey, allied in NATO and knocking on the
door of Europe, open criticism may be the only way to secure
real change.
Another commentator questions Ignatieff's assumption
that human rights discourse has become intoxicated with
triumphalism. How
could this be so, he asks, with so many millions dead in
India/Pakistan, Biafra, Vietnam, Chile, Cambodia and Rwanda
since the Universal Declaration was adopted?
The book closes with a reply by Ignatieff to the
commentaries. At the end, he comes back to the image of Primo
Levi standing before the director of the chemical department
at Auchwitz. His bottom-line is that abuses of human rights
and basic human dignity are at least as deeply imbued in
the human psyche as is the notion that we must give each
other respect and space to live our lives as we individually
choose. At the end,
Ignatieff endorses the thesis of another writer in this
area, Judith Shklar, who preached "putting cruelty
first". Recognising that liberal freedoms and constitutionalism
may still be some way off, the priority in human rights
protection, according to Ignatieff, is to prevent the worst
excesses of torture, killings, rapes and other abominations. Despite the noble texts of the United Nations treaties, international
institutions failed to prevent the Rwanda genocide. This was so although people with power to do
something could not pretend, as many Germans did in 1945,
that they were unaware of the genocide that was happening.
Ignatieff is not an opponent of the world human rights
movement. His minimalism is aimed at targeting action
more deliberately so that the practical outcomes will represent
less hot air and more lives saved.
The debates recounted in this beautifully produced
book from Princeton University are relevant to Australia,
indeed to all countries, as the world enters the next phase
of human rights discourse after September 11. It is timely to have these insights into where
we are and where we should be going.
Even when their solutions are contestable, there
is no doubt that Ignatieff and his colleagues are asking
the right questions.