THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY
DIRECTORS
TASMANIAN DIVISION
LUNCHEON ADDRESS HOBART, TASMANIA
31 MARCH 1998
THE COMPANY DIRECTOR: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC
CMG 1
PAST
In order to understand the present and
to foresee the future, we must study the past. Explaining
how the corporation was invented by English law and
then found its way to Australia and other lands is an
interesting exercise. It teaches that sometimes the
law can be highly imaginative. It can be part of the
solution rather than part of the problem.
The seeds for the idea of a corporation,
a body having a legal personality separate from that
of its shareholders, can be traced in English law at
least to the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. Indeed, that
time, which was one of great national confidence and
economic growth in England, saw many legal developments
which laid the foundations of the modern laws of bankruptcy
2
, intellectual property 3
and company law. Lord Wilberforce, one of the great
English jurists of this century, has described the way
in which the idea of the company developed. He put the
development into a broader context 4
:
"The company, the abolition of the laws
of usury, the introduction of cheques, the formulation
of Patent Law and trademarks, were all part of a movement
which did not merely reflect the expansion of commercial
practice; but also, perhaps more truly, gave an essential
impulse to it".
In the time of Elizabeth I, Crown monopolies
were established to help exploit high risk investments
in the overseas colonies, settlements and trading posts
of the Crown. Charter companies were established with
a monopoly from the Crown. These provided the origin
of the notion of a body independent of the investors,
which was permitted, by law, to engage in sometimes
risky and speculative commercial ventures but with only
limited personal liability in the adventurers.
The modern reincarnation of laws on bankruptcy,
intellectual property and corporations had to await,
as Lord Wilberforce pointed out, another period of great
national confidence and economic resurgence in England.
I refer to the reign of Queen Victoria. It was in that
time that the basic legal foundations of the modern
capitalist economy were enacted by the Parliament at
Westminster. The British colonies took advantage of
such laws which were often extended to apply to them.
In this way, they inherited the institutional and intellectual
framework of law within which their fledgling economies
could quickly flourish. As I walked around the beautiful
colonial buildings by the harbour in Hobart, it was
brought home to me, most powerfully, how confident was
the force that propelled the British Empire to the far
reaches of the world. In part, as we in New South Wales
and Tasmania at least know, the motivation was the disposal
of unwanted convicts. But it soon became the pursuit
of profit, with personal and economic advantage. And
so the first courts were established, laws enacted and
corporations set up to provide the infrastructure for
economic prosperity, high employment and an ordered
civil society.
The idea of an independent corporation,
governed by directors and accountable to shareholders,
was a brilliant one. It permitted people to raise capital
from the public, to invest it without, in most cases,
a danger of personal risk and to engage in entrepreneurial
activity which, otherwise, would probably not occur.
But this legal invention was created under conditions
which obliged the corporation and its directors to conform
to a number of basic rules. The rule of ultra vires
that kept the corporation within its charter - a
doctrine borrowed from the old charter companies and
Crown monopolies of the first Elizabethan era. The doctrine
of the separate existence of the corporation and a general
unwillingness to lift the corporate veil 5
. The provision of rules limiting the liability of the
corporation and defining the relatively rare circumstances
in which its directors would be personally liable when
things went wrong. The imposition of duties on the directors
to act, as such, with honesty, skill, care and diligence.
The imposition of duties on the company itself in the
raising of capital from the public and the expenditure
of the funds so raised. The central problem of the company
was, from the beginning, that of securing the advantages
of this brilliant legal idea whilst keeping the directors
and the management accountable to the shareholders.
That problem remains the central challenge for company
law and policy right into our own time.
When we reflect upon the way in which
the law invented the company, this indispensable device
for modern economic growth, a question is immediately
posed. What contribution is the law making today, of
an equivalent kind, to boost the economy, provide jobs,
encourage investment and stimulate proper risk-taking?
Have we run out of steam in the marketplace of legal
ideas? Are we in a kind of doldrums such as those which
interrupted legal imagination between the great statutes
of the reign of Elizabeth I until there was a new period
of imagination in the reign of Queen Victoria? Where
is the modern equivalent of the legal imagination that
gave birth to the highly successful idea of the limited
liability company? On the brink of a new millennium,
we should be thinking creatively about the ways in which
the law can facilitate economic development and not
simply coerce, regulate and control its occasional errors
and ugly manifestations. This is not specifically a
challenge to company directors. It is primarily a challenge
to lawyers. Just as the corporation idea grew out of
the early Crown monopolies for the colonies, so future
bold strokes of company law will almost certainly grow
out of the present idea of the corporation. We should
be enquiring as to what the future directions of company
law will offer. The seeds of the future usually lie
in the past.
If we look into the recent past, we can
see some of the explanations for the strategies of company
law and policy in Australia over the last decade. What
occurred in that time helps to explain the pressure
which was placed both upon parliaments and courts, to
endorse stricter rules in order to uphold greater integrity
on the part of corporations, their management and directors.
Law does not develop in a vacuum. It responds to the
perceived needs of the society which it serves.
The extent of the problem is well explained
in an essay by Ms Linda English and Dr James Guthrie
6
. In case we had forgotten, they recount the unhappy
recent history of corporate failures in Australia:
"The excesses of the late 1980s and
subsequent corporate losses have highlighted a litany
of accountability and control problems in both private
and public sector organisations. Several collapses in
the private sector, such as those of Rothwells Banks,
the Skase media empire, the Bond group and various property
developers, have reverberated in the public sector and
combined to financial disasters experienced by government
owned banks. In Victoria, the financial collapse of
Tricontinental cost the government an estimated $2.5
billion, while South Australia lost $3.2 billion through
the demise of the State Bank of South Australia ...
The political fallout from these disasters has contributed
to the governments in Victoria, South Australia and
Western Australia being removed from office. The social
and financial implications are still being felt in those
states as government funding for schools, roads, hospitals
and other much needed social infrastructure is cut to
help finance the losses".
Trevor Sykes, in his book The Bold
Riders also reminds us of the litany 7
:
"The collapses included Australia's
largest industrial group (Adelaide Steamship); the ninth
largest enterprise in the nation measured by revenue
(Bond Corporation); nearly half the brewing industry
(Bond Brewing); all three major commercial television
networks (Bond Media, Qintex, Channel 10); Australia's
largest car renter (Budget); the second largest newspaper
group (Fairfax); Victoria's largest building society
(Pyramid); and Australia's largest textile group (Linter)
... Total writeoffs and provisions by banks and financiers
amounted to $28b. Australia's three largest merchant
banks (Tricontinental, Partnership Pacific and Elders
Finance) had to be rescued by their parents. Two of
Australia's four State Banks (State Bank of Victoria
and State Bank of South Australia) suffered devastating
losses and had to be investigated by Royal Commission
... The four major trading banks (Westpac, National,
Commonwealth and ANZ) had to write billions of dollars
off their loan books".
It may be mildly irritating to have a
reminder of these sorry examples of corporate failures.
But it is necessary that we do not forget them. They
provide the only foundation upon which effective laws
and policies for Australian corporations can be built.
Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat its mistakes.
Trevor Sykes, in vivid language, has declared 8
:
"Never before in Australian history
had so much money been channelled by so many people
incompetent to lend it into the hands of so many people
incompetent to manage it".
Some people suggest that the explanation
for this sorry history, still vivid in mind, is nothing
more than the personal failings of a few individual
"corporate cowboys" or "bold riders". If this were so,
the chances of repetition of such wrongdoing might be
minimal. But a more likely explanation is that the events
of the late 1980s and early 1990s portrayed a failure
of law, policy and ethics. Sykes again:
"If the financial community worked the
way it is supposed to, outside directors would have
exercised their authority over runaway chief executives;
accountants and auditors would have detected and exposed
the pea and thimble tricks in the bold riders' accounts;
lawyers would have refused to endorse their thefts;
merchant banks would not have lent money and imprimatur
to their schemes; brokers would not have pushed their
shares; fund managers would not have invested in them;
and the financial press would have castigated them.
Thus another truly remarkable phenomenon of the 1980s
was the way in which all these professions prostituted
themselves - with the odd honourable exception - to
the bold riders".
This, then, is the past against which
we must measure the present and the future. The corporation,
an idea taken from the past, is still the central legal
instrument for our economic well being. This is why
directors are so important to the Australian economy
and its society. But the memory of recent failures,
must propel us to legal and other responses that uphold,
in a more effective way, the duties of honesty, of skill,
care and diligence in the governance of companies and
in vigilance on the part of those who uphold these central
values.
PRESENT
I have said that the response to the events
just described was one which resulted in new legal duties
being imposed on company directors in Australia. The
Federal Parliament, for example, introduced a statutory
standard of reasonable care and diligence 9
. Numerous cases came before the courts in which attempts
were made to hold directors to higher standards than
the common law had earlier expressed. Probably the best
known of these cases was AWA Limited v Daniels 10.
The decision at first instance of Rogers CJ Comm Div,
sitting in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, was
the starting point. It was interpreted as adopting a
"practical" approach to directors' duties. As reinforcing
the notion that non-executive directors were only liable
in a case of gross negligence. That their duty of care
was to be judged by subjective and not objective standards.
That they could delegate most of functions to management.
Those who commented on the judgment sometimes considered
that it provided a soft charter for "sleeping" directors.
In fact, the judgment was probably in the mainstream
of Australian case law to that time 11
.
Then came the majority decision in the
appeal in that case 12
. The New South Wales Court of Appeal (Clarke and
Sheller JJA; Powell JA contra) upheld a more rigorous
standard than that which had found favour at first instance.
Borrowing from developments in negligence law, the Court
of Appeal asserted that the test to be applied was an
objective one 13.
A minimum standard of competence on the part of all
directors was required by the law. All directors would
have to ensure that their decisions were informed, independent
and involved the active exercise of their discretions.
The notion that liability of directors was limited to
cases of gross negligence was rejected.
Superficial reading of the Court of Appeal's
decision led to panic in some quarters in corporate
Australia. However, more reflective comments suggested
that, if the decisions of Australian courts over the
past decade were fairly analysed, they would show two
trends. First, a growing judicial impatience with "sleeping"
or passive directors on the boards of Australian companies
14.
Secondly, a realistic appreciation that directors could
not assume all the functions of managers, auditors and
systems controllers of companies. Those directors who
had exercised their powers and carried out their duties
honestly and conscientiously to the best of their ability
would normally not be held to have breached their duty
of care. They would be exempt from personal liability.
Nevertheless, the concerns lingered following
the Court of Appeal decision in the AWA case. The anxiety
was probably not that courts would fail, in the end,
to excuse honest and conscientious directors but that
the standard expressed by the Court of Appeal might
expose directors, more frequently than in the past and
unjustifiably, to expensive and problematical litigation.
This would involve risks, could put pressures upon them
for adverse settlements and divert the attention of
corporations from the serious business of economic entrepreneurship
to litigation and lawyering 15.
The one thing that all involved in Australian corporate
policy were concerned to avoid was the evisceration
of companies, such that none could make serious commercial
decisions without having the daily approval of lawyers.
It is in this context that the recent
announcement of the Federal Treasurer (Mr Peter Costello)
is to be understood. On 17 March 1998, the Treasurer
stated that the Federal Government would introduce legislation
later in the year to reform Australia's company law
16.
Amongst the proposals included in the Treasurer's announcement
are two of great importance to company directors. One
is a proposal to enact a "new business judgment rule
to provide more certainty for directors". The other
is a proposal for "new shareholders' rights to take
action on behalf of companies". At this time the precise
content of the new legislative proposals is not known.
But, significantly, the proposed reform of directors'
duties is given the highest priority in the Treasurer's
announcement. It is said to envisage "a safe harbour
from personal liability for breaches of the duty of
care and diligence in relation to honest, informed and
rational business judgments".
The Treasurer's announcement has been
generally welcomed by the Australian financial press.
The reform of the expression of directors' legal liabilities
was explained by The Age as being designed to provide
"marginally less expose[ure] to personal liability for
decisions they make" 17.
The proposed new "business judgment rule" was described
in the Australian Financial Review as 18
:
"Basically a legislative reversal
of the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in AWA, when
it overturned an earlier decision of Justice Andrew
Rogers in 1995. Rogers had effectively written a business
judgment rule into the common law by letting directors
off the hook over the shenanigans that went on in AWA's
foreign exchange transactions, but the Court of Appeal
threw it out and put directors squarely back in the
frame".
As reported in the Australian Financial
Review, although the new "business judgment rule" has
been welcomed by the Australian Institute of Directors,
there is less enthusiasm for the introduction of new
derivative actions which might (depending upon the statutory
language) permit minority shareholders, recalcitrant
directors and others to bring proceedings in the name
of the company which the directors in control of the
company do not favour. Fear has been expressed that
this might become a new goldmine for lawyers and another
distraction from the real business of corporate governance
for economic rather than legal productivity. Supporters
suggest that courts will be well able to discourage
vexatious litigation.
Against the backdrop of problems of the
kind which I have briefly sketched, still remembered
by Australian investors and citizens, the need for effective
checks upon, and appropriate standards for, company
directors is obvious. The challenge before lawmakers
is to establish a regime which will provide these checks
and uphold such standards without unduly reducing the
capacity of the company and its officers to perform
the economic functions for which the corporation was
established. We are talking of a delicate balance. In
Australia, the point at which that balance is struck
cannot ignore the recent examples of corporate failures
which also evidenced the failures of the legal system
and of the independent directors who should have vigilantly
protected shareholders, their companies and the public
from the devastating losses which occurred. The last
word will never be written upon where the delicate balance
is to be set. Each age will strike its own legislative
and legal standards. It will do so by reference to a
number of considerations, including the state of the
economy, the contemporary history of corporate failures
the business cycle, investor speculation, the "feel
good" factor, the strength of the exchange rate and
the perceived means of upholding ethical standards of
honesty and care in ways that do not stifle the spirit
of adventure, risk taking and entrepreneurship on the
part of companies. When the corporation loses that spirit
it has lost its essential motivating force.
FUTURE
Because the future will grow out of the
present, it is clear that Australian company directors
will have to operate in a legal environment which is
undergoing reconsideration and change. The basic reason
behind the Treasurer's announcement was said to be the
Government's desire to boost economic activity, stimulate
small business and create employment opportunities:
all legitimate purposes at this time.
By the same token, it seems clear that
company directors in Australia need to lift their game.
I refer not only to the record of shocking failures
and neglect of a decade ago. More recently, a report
on research undertaken by Professor Ian Ramsay and Mr
Richard Hoad of the University of Melbourne produced
results which were discouraging. In a survey conducted
by Professor Ramsay 19,
who is a leader in empirical research on the actual
operation of corporations in Australia, he and Mr Hoad
record some rather sobering news. The survey shows that:
"65% of companies do not discuss procedures
for reviewing the performance of management and directors
and only 42% of large companies regularly review the
performance of management. Apparently the vast majority
of companies don't distinguish between executive and
non-executive directors".
This report is clearly a disappointment.
It suggests that "sleeping" or "passive" directors still
occupy valuable seats in Australian board rooms. This
presents a danger to the long-term stability of Australian
corporations. In the current national and regional economic
climate, Australia could not easily afford another era
of "cowboys" and "bold riders". Yet the real protection
against their re-emergence lies not in courtrooms or
even in the work of regulatory authorities. It lies
in the boardrooms of the nation. Somehow the standards
of vigilance and competence of directors and the superintendence
by them of effective, honest and diligent management
must be improved. Certainly this is so if the research
by Ramsay and Hoad is even partly representative.
Beyond the problems of striking a new
balance in the legal position of Australia's company
directors and lifting their performance of their duties,
there are many long-term challenges which need to be
faced. It seems safe to suggest that the long-term challenges
facing company directors in Australia will derive from
the two great connected engines of change that are at
work in the world today. I refer to globalism and technology.
These forces are not, of course, unconnected. Technology
itself produces global economic markets as well as global
problems for lawmakers and regulators. I recently returned
from a meeting in Paris where attempts were being made
to secure agreement on the international body which
will devise the standards for the conduct of genomic
sciences. The ethical, legal and social problems presented
by the Human Genome Project are enormous. It is beyond
the capacity of any single state to respond effectively
to them. A similar challenge is presented by the Internet.
And by HIV/AIDS, global warming, human rights and so
on. These problems are so pervasive, international and
powerful, that nation states appear to have lost the
capacity to control or regulate them effectively. It
is in this environment that the company of the future
must operate. Companies too are increasingly global
in their organisation and ownership 20.
The problems presented to them, as the Bophal disaster
vividly illustrates, can be trans-national and overwhelming.
Companies are losing their roots in the states in which
they were originally formed. They are taking on a regional
or international character, reflecting the dynamic of
globalism 21.
In the law and in the judiciary, we are
adapting to new information technology in ways that
would have been regarded as unthinkable even a decade
ago. High Court decisions may be downloaded from the
Internet within minutes of their delivery in Canberra.
Judgments are now reported in media neutral format.
Many special leave hearings conducted by the High Court
use video links to span our continental country. The
Australian Law Reform Commission is even suggesting
that simple legal problems may, in the future, be susceptible
to decision-making by artificial intelligence 22.
Obviously, within corporations, the new information
technology provides ways of monitoring developments,
accounts and markets that would have been unknown to
the managers and directors even of the recent past.
If the law can embrace technology, it is essential that
Australia's company directors should be alert to the
implications for their activities of globalism and technology.
Perhaps in these two dynamic forces lie the creative
ideas of the corporation of the future. Vigilant company
directors in Australia will be on the lookout for the
implications of these forces for their companies.
Despite the disappointments of the recent
past, the history of the corporation is one of a brilliant
legal idea, quickly taken up by business people, to
the great advantage of modern economies and those who
live within them. In Australia, we are in the midst
of rethinking some of the checks and balances which
our law provides to uphold honesty, skill, care and
diligence on the part of those who govern companies
for the benefit of shareholders, as well as for their
employees and society at large. In the future, the corporation
will need to adapt to the forces of globalism and technology
which lie at the heart of the most important changes
in the world today. I suspect that, in future, it will
not be enough for the company director to be honest
and conscientious. It will also be essential for the
director to be informed about technological trends and
global changes. Only in this way will the Australian
director of the future keep pace with the challenges
that are now presented to the corporation.
Yet amidst all the challenge and change,
the old purpose of the corporation must never be forgotten.
To make rational investments. To take measured risks.
To be bold and creative. To be innovative and to meet
market demands. Keeping the best of the brilliant idea
of the corporation whilst adapting to times of unprecedented
change is the fundamental challenge which Australian
company directors must meet.
|
1
|
Justice of the High Court
of Australia. |
|
2
|
13 Eliz I, c 5. See Cannane
v J Cannane Pty Limited (In Liq) [1998] HCA 26
at par 82-88. |
|
3
|
Advanced Building Systems
Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd [1998]
HCA 19 at par 51. The Statute of Monopolies 1623
(GB) actually dates from the reign of King James
I (21 Jac I c 3). |
|
4
|
Lord Wilberforce, "Law
and Economics" in P W Harvey (ed) The Lawyer and
Justice , Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1978 at 73.
See also National Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd v Benson
(1988) 12 NSWLR 213 at 222 per Priestley JA and
M D Kirby, "Rethinking Company Law and Practice"
(1995) 5 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 176.
|
|
5
|
Salomon v Salomon [1897]
AC 22. See Wilberforce, above n 3, at 78-79. |
|
6
|
L English and J Guthrie,
"An Overview of Directors' Obligations and Accountability
Standards for Government Business Enterprises
in the 1990s" (1996) 7 Australian Journal of Corporate
Law 120. |
|
7
|
S Miller, "Corporate Crime,
The Excesses of the Eighties and Collective Responsibility:
An Ethical Perspective" (1995) 5 Australian Journal
of Corporate Law 139 citing T Sykes, The Bold
Riders , Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994, 1-2. |
|
8
|
Sykes, above n 6, 2. See
also Miller, above n 6, 140. |
|
9
|
Corporations Law s 232(4).
See J Cassidy, "Has the 'Sleeping' Director Finally
Been Laid to Rest?" (1997) 25 Australian Business
Law Review 102 at 115-116. |
|
10
|
(1992) 10 ACLC 933 (SC); (1995)
37 NSWLR 438; 13 ACLC 614 (CA). |
|
11
|
A S Sievers, "Directors'
Duty of Care: What is the New Standard?" (1997)
15 Companies and Securities Law Journal 392. See
also J Cassidy, "Has the 'Sleeping' Director Finally
Been Laid to Rest?" (1997) 25 Australian Business
Law Review 102; R Campbell, "No Hiding Place for
CEO's in a Crisis" (1997) 13(9) Company Director
10. |
|
12
|
(1995) 37 NSWLR 438 (CA);
(1995) 13 ACLC 614. |
|
13
|
cf Re Property Force Consulting
Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1955) 95 ATC 1, 051. |
|
14
|
cf Metal Manufacturers'
Ltd v Lewis (1998) 13 NSWLR 315 at 318-319; 6
ACLC 725 at 728; Commonwealth Bank of Australia
v Friedrich (1991) 9 ACLC 946. |
|
15
|
L Law, "The Business Judgment
Rule in Australia: A Reappraisal Since the AWA
Case (1997) 15 Company and Securities Law Journal
174. |
|
16
|
Press Release, The Hon
Peter Costello MP (Treasurer), "Business Law Reforms
to Boost Jobs and Economic Development" (No. 028),
17 March 1998. |
|
17
|
"Investors Beware", Editorial,
The Age, 21 March 1998 at 11. |
|
18
|
G Newington, "Back to the
Board Room" in Australian Financial Review, 21
March 1998 at 60. |
|
19
|
As reported in Newington,
above n 15. See I Ramsay and G Hoad, "Disclosures!
Corporate Governance in Practice" (1998) 14(2)
Company Director 11. |
|
20
|
It has been suggested that
the growing number of modern corporations owned
offshore requires radical reconsideration of laws
and practices developed upon an assumption of
local shareholder owned companies. See W Rosenberg,
"Directors' Duties" [1998] NZLJ 78; cf M D Kirby,
"Australian Corporations Law and Global forces"
(1998) 2 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 41 at
46ff. |
|
21
|
J P Lehmann, "Who writes
today's economic scripts?" in Financial Times,
27 March 1998, Supplement "Mastering Global Business",
2-3; R Donkin, "Global Guidelines", Financial
Times 27 March 1998, 10 suggests that it "was
only a matter of time before someone had the idea
of looking at [corporate governance] from an international
perspective". |
|
22
|
Australian Law Reform Commission,
Technology - what it means for federal dispute
resolution (Issues Paper 23), March 1998 at pars
6.9-6.15. |