BOOK
REVIEW
AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL
NEW BOOKS
ANGELS
OF DEATH
-
EXPLORING THE EUTHANASIA UNDERGROUND
AUTHOR: ROGER
S MAGNUSSON
PUBLISHER: MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002
ISBN: 0 522 84970 9
PRICE: Softcover $
The
author of this book teaches law at the University
of Sydney. He has chosen a topic for study that makes
most people feel uncomfortable. Yet as recent experience
shows, it is a topic that is increasingly visiting
the higher courts as they are invited to solve contested
problems of life and death.
In
Rodrieguez v Attorney-General of Canada [1994]
2 LRC 136, the Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority
of five Justices to four, rejected a claim that the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms permitted a
profoundly disabled person, beyond the physical ability
to end her own life, to have the assistance of a medical
practitioner to bring her life to a close at a moment
of her own choosing. Suicide is not a crime in Canada.
But counselling or procuring an act of suicide is.
The majority in the Canadian decision thought that
effective protection of life, and especially of vulnerable
people, sustained the maintenance of the statutory
prohibition without exceptions. The minority argued
that it was discriminatory to deny some people the
choice of ending their lives "solely because they
are physically unable to do so".
A
similar case was recently heard by the House of Lords:
Pretty v DPP [2001] 3 WLR 1598; [2002] 1 All
ER 1. Mrs Pretty suffers from motor neurone disease.
It is progressive and will eventually bring her to
a point where she cannot swallow or breathe. She now
lacks the physical ability to end her life. Her husband
is willing to help her terminate her life when she
so signifies. But he would only do so with the protection
of a court declaration that it would not be a crime.
English law on suicide is similar to Canadian
law. Mrs Pretty sought to invoke the European Convention
on Human Rights, now incorporated in United Kingdom
law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). She
argued her grounds of appeal based on the guaranteed
right to life (art 2), the right to protection from
inhuman and degrading treatment (art 3), privacy (art
8), freedom of thought and religion (art 9) and the
prohibition against status discrimination (art 14).
The Law Lords unanimously rejected the claim. But
Lord Bingham of Cornhill opened his reasons with the
statement "No one of ordinary sensitivity could be
unmoved by the frightening ordeal which faces Mrs
Dianne Pretty".
The
Law Lords' decision in Pretty may be contrasted
with that of the English Court of Appeal in 2001 concerning
the Attard conjoint (Siamese) twins: In re A (conjoined
twins: surgical separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480;
(2000) 4 All ER 961. There the court authorised a
separation operation that was bound to result in the
death of one of the twins, as it did. Although that
decision might be seen as life-affirming (in that
it saved one life otherwise bound to die) it still
represented a difficult intervention that went beyond
the earlier decision of the same court and the House
of Lords in 1992-3. This had concluded that it was
permissible to cease treating a brain-dead patient,
although doing so would certainly lead to death: Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. A lethal injection
was impermissible. But the withdrawal of treatment
was held legally justifiable in the circumstances.
In Australia, the law of suicide has been brought
into line in all jurisdictions with English and Canadian
law. Suicide is no longer an offence resulting, as
it formerly did at common law, in forfeiture of property
to the Crown. Nor is attempted suicide an offence.
But assisting or encouraging another person to commit
suicide is an offence in every Australian jurisdiction.
The attempt by the Northern Territory by the Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT) to permit
assisted death in defined cases under regulated conditions
was over-ridden by federal legislation: Euthanasia
Laws Act 1997 (Cth). However, Bills to similar
effect have been promised in at least two Australian
States. More can be expected as public opinion polls
in Australia indicate majority support for the general
idea of euthanasia.
It
is into this legal minefield that Roger Magnusson
has stepped with his book. Unlike many texts on legally
related topics, the author has adopted a scientific
or empirical approach. With the assistance of Professor
P H Ballis, he has undertaken an extensive course
of interviews with medical practitioners, nurses,
social workers, patients and families of people who
have pursued suicide options when living became intolerable
to them. Many of the patients whose stories are recounted
in this book are, or were, young people dying from
AIDS. Because of their age, and often rejection by
their biological families, such people have not uncommonly
wished to take charge of the ending of their lives.
The book suggests that an informal network exists
in Australia to help the profoundly disabled to bring
their lives to an end. But it also suggests that some
cases involve "cowboys" and incompetent operators
whose activities are reprehensible but rarely, if
ever, come to light.
The
fundamental quandary presented by the book is basically
that which occupied the attention of the Canadian
and British judges, although it approaches the puzzle
in a different way. Is it better to retain the present
law, even knowing that it is sometimes honoured in
the breach and contains illogical elements, so as
to uphold the law's unyielding commitment to protecting
life, especially of the vulnerable? If assisted death
were made easier, would dying people be placed under
pressure to make the "ultimate sacrifice", as the
author puts it, for the sake of the "family silver"?
Or should the law be changed?
In
the end, Roger Magnusson comes down in favour of permitting
assisted death in strictly limited cases, mainly to
introduce effective regulation of what he sees as
unacceptably variable "underground" practices. In
this, he reflects a view stated in the United States
Supreme Court by Justice Brennan in the Cruzan
Case 497 US 261 at 310 (1990): "Dying is personal.
And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble
end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent".
To
some extent, modern palliative care, with the final
painkilling injection that is certain to result in
death, resolves the underlying issue of this book
in ways that exempt lawyers from involvement. But
the state of the present law is the background for
the "underground" described by the author. Recent
experience elsewhere suggests that our courts will
eventually face issues raised by the dilemmas that
the author has addressed.
The
book is beautifully produced by Melbourne University
Press. It has a first-rate bibliography and index,
the latter including an entry on "God" who secures
many mentions. It is written with sensitivity and
with much detail on legal developments in Australia
and overseas. The interview methodology has its dangers.
But it has yielded many powerful statements concerning
the desires of patients, facing with equanimity their
journey to the "undiscovered country" from which no
traveller returns.