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Speeches
NEW SILKS CEREMONY
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
31 JANUARY 2000
A TOAST TO THE NEW SILKS
BY THE HON JUSTICE IDF CALLINAN
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Today is the first occasion upon which you have worn your
new silken robes in the High Court. Thoreau, the nineteenth
century American naturalist and philosopher warned, "mistrust
any new enterprise that requires new clothes". Those in ancient
Rome who were awarded triumphs were also provided with "prompters"
(slaves) who whispered in their ears as their processions
passed the Forum, remember you are mortal. The lesson from
these, is, I suppose, that it is as well to remember that
fallibility is not incompatible with the status of Senior
Counsel.
Tonight will, I hope remain with you all as a memorable occasion.
It is for me a particular pleasure to propose this toast of
the evening to the new silks. I would like to think that in
spirit I remain one of you.
Most of you probably know, but it would no doubt surprise
those who criticise the institution of silk, that the Order
originated from a perceived need to break down monopolies
and enhance competition in professional practice, and for
appointment to the Benches of England.
It is almost certain that the Order dates from 1604 when
Sir Francis Bacon was appointed King's Counsel Extraordinary.
It soon however lost its special character as Counsel to the
Monarch exclusively and became a patent of precedence.
The patent which each of you has today is not a Grand Patent
issued by Her Majesty the Queen of Australia. Your entitlements
differ because various, not entirely uniform rules, now exist
in the different jurisdictions with respect to enrolment as
silk. Nevertheless, the effect is the same - you are recognised
by a formal and substantial process as being the senior members
of the practising profession of advocates. Recognition is
conferred only after a process of application and assessment,
involving consultation at least, with those most harsh of
critics, your peers.
It is interesting to reflect a little more upon the evolution
of the order. The gradual ascendancy of silk meant the beginning
of the end for what had been the oldest, most powerful, most
senior and probably least competitive limb of the legal profession
- the Serjeants-at-law. Theirs was an ancient order; so ancient
that its origins are shrouded in ambiguity, and the mystery,
privilege, secrecy and mistrust that tend to be associated
with such ambiguity. The appointment of silks led ultimately
to the loss of the Serjeants' exclusive rights of appearance
in the Court of Common Pleas and their longstanding monopoly
over appointments to the Bench.
Not surprisingly, the Serjeants-at-law bitterly resented
this intrusion upon their patch. In his book, "The Order of
the Coif", Serjeant Pulling lamented the growing influence
of the intruders. He described matters relating to silk in
a sow's ear kind of way: of potential silks who contrived
their appointments, of the institution being an " anomaly
", of the "batches" of appointments made and of the "multitudinous
and indiscriminate creation of Queens Counsel". He alleged
that a "very gross injustice" had been inflicted on the Serjeants
by the "contrivance" of silk.
Perhaps some enterprising contemporary opponent of the institution
might like to send a copy of the Serjeant's work to some of
the persistent media critics of the institution.
Now I want to ask you to hypothesise. Regard this as your
final test for admission to the Order of Silk. Assume that
the order of silk had not emerged in 1600: but in 2000. The
Serjeants still hold monopolies on practice. Judicial appointments
are made only from their ranks. They are powerful, well-connected
and privileged. They live principally in Double Bay, Toorak
and Ascot and own internet companies. Along comes a bright
Attorney-General. She proposes far-reaching reforms. No more
Serjeants will ever be appointed. All monopoly rights will
be withdrawn. Their restrictive trade practices are at an
end, she announces. In their place, an egalitarian institution
is hereby established. Appointments to it will be made only
on merit after extensive consultation and consideration. Only
the best will be eligible. The appointees will form a group
of people recognised as possessing greater skill and experience
than other members of the Bar. Any practitioner can apply
and is entitled to have his or her application carefully examined
and assessed. A designation will be adopted after the appointee's
name to indicate to the public and profession alike that this
person has highly developed skills and extensive experience.
The reaction? Professors Hilmer and Fels rejoice openly.
A press release is issued. "At last there is an end to the
long reign of the Serjeants over the Courts and their practices.
In their place is established a competitive, modern, anti-monopolistic
and efficient instrument of reform of the legal profession".
It is only to be expected that the institution of Silk would
not escape in this country the all-pervading suspicion that
any apparent form of elitism or recognition, however deserved,
tends to attract. The truth is that the Bar, and the Silks,
as its most eminent and senior practitioners, are engaged
in a uniquely competitive activity. I am unaware of any substantial
legal barriers to the practice of advocacy by any qualified
and admitted lawyer if she or he wishes. The most important
work that is done by barristers is done in public. It is done
not only in an abstract way, but also in a direct and immediate
way, in actual, sometimes, fierce competition with other barristers.
No one is compelled to brief senior counsel. Everyone is entitled
to stipulate the fee that he or she is prepared to pay, just
as counsel is free to say that he or she will not accept that
fee. All of this sounds much more like a free market place
than the market place in which a number of the critics of
the Bar and of the institution of silk operate.
It is, in my personal opinion, entirely appropriate that
there should be a senior rank of counsel. And I think it is
difficult to find compelling arguments against it. The judiciary,
public servants, the defence forces, academe, financial institutions
and all other public institutions rank their members, not
just for symbolic reasons but also for good, practical ones.
Indeed, even the media rank journalists. The fact that barristers
are sole practitioners is itself an important factor in ensuring
independence and competitiveness.
Perhaps the profession needs to do more to dispel the ignorance
which exists among even those who should know better about
the way in which the bar and its senior members practise.
One might ask whether the authors of the report on the implications
arising from the Hilmer proposals made by the Industry Commission
had ever visited a set of barristers' chambers. If they had
they might not have written that the Bars should be encouraged
(by implication, compelled) to incorporate or form partnerships
in order to obtain the advantage and cost savings of shared
chambers, staff, library and electronic facilities1.
The legal profession today, in each of its various branches
seems to be but grist to the critics' mill. The adversarial
system and all who sail in her are under attack. Those who
do the attacking might do well to look at the situation which
exists in those countries in which an inquisitorial system
operates. There is in France widespread disillusionment with
the Inquisitorial system and the way in which such a system
may represent a threat to judicial independence. In France
and Italy examining Judges are coming under attack for abusing
a system that assumes guilt before charges are brought. There
have been at least as many blunders by the judicial inquisitors
as there have been by the police forces in the common law
countries. The new French Justice Minister is struggling to
reform the justice system and has gone so far as to make an
admission of a kind that is not always popular and rarely
made in France, that the British Common Law system may have
some advantages. The Supreme Court of Japan, in its official
handbook takes pride in the adoption, by the 1946 Constitution
of that country, of the adversarial system and the rules against
the reception of hearsay evidence2.
All of you here tonight of course have an important role to
play in continuing to refine and improve the adversarial system.
It used to be said in England that one, perhaps the most
important criterion for a grant of silk was whether, he -
it was always he in those days - would make a respectable
County Court Judge if he failed as a Silk. Then there were
real risks in taking silk of a kind that you do not have to
face, because no silk could appear without a junior, and his
- again it was almost invariably his - fee could not be less
than two thirds of the leader's. There were, in consequence,
not a few, who brought successful careers as juniors to a
sudden and unhappy end by an unprudent successful application
for silk.
There are among you only five women. Tonight is not the occasion
to debate whether that number should be regarded as a reasonably
sufficient number in all of the circumstances. But on any
view, that you are at last here and that your numbers are
increasing, show that we have moved a distance from some of
he discriminatory practices of the past. The first woman law
student in France, Mlle Chauvin initially applied for admission
to the French Bar in 1892. It was not until 1900, after repeated
applications and the personal intervention of such statesmen
as Poincare and Viviani that she was able finally to obtain
admission to practice. By 1914 only a dozen women were practising
in France.
The position had been no better in the common law countries.
Miss Lavinia Goodell applied to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
for admission in December 1875. She was able to produce a
certificate that she had been examined in open court, that
she was a resident of the state, that she was a person of
good moral character and that she possessed sufficient legal
knowledge and ability to justify admission as an attorney
and councillor at law. Ryan CJ, speaking for the Court, after
discussing the statutes, which, despite their generally "gender
neutral" language, he held to be completely against her, said
this3:
- "So we find no statutory authority for the admission
of females to the bar of any court of this state. And, with
all the respect and sympathy for this lady which all men
owe to all good women, we cannot regret that we do not.
We cannot but think the common law wise in excluding women
from the profession of the law. The profession enters largely
into the well being of society; and, to be honorably filled
and safely to society, exacts the devotion of life. The
law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for
the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and
for the custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance
in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women,
inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties of their
sex, as is the profession of the law, are departures from
the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against
it. But it is public policy to provide for the sex, not
for its superfluous members; and not to tempt women from
the proper duties of their sex by opening to them duties
peculiar to ours. There are many employments in life not
unfit for female character. The profession of the law is
surely not one of these. The peculiar qualities of womanhood,
its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility,
its purity, its delicacy, it emotional impulses, its subordination
of hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not qualifications
for forensic strife. Nature has tempered woman as little
for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as for the
physical conflicts of the battle field. Womanhood is moulded
for gentler and better things. It would be revolting to
all female sense of the innocence and sanctity of their
sex, shocking to man's reverence for womanhood and faith
in woman, on which hinge all the better affections and humanities
of life, that woman should be permitted to mix professionally
in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into
courts of justice".
The last thing that I would wish to do on this night for congratulations
is to harangue you about the way in which you should prepare
your outlines of arguments and addresses to the Court. However,
I could perhaps leave you with one piece of advice to be distilled
from a criticism by Carolyn Chute that appeared in the New
York Times , of the works the celebrated American author
William Faulkner. The critic wrote, "he uses a lot if big
words, and his sentences are from here back to the airport".
As I recollect, this ceremony was resurrected in 1996 after
a lapse of some years. That there should be a presentation
of commissions in Canberra was originally the idea of an Australian
Bar Association. It is a pity that, for a time it fell into
disuse. It was an important and wholly worthy initiative.
That we are here together tonight is an indication of the
national nature of the profession and of the interdependence
of the courts and the Bar upon each other. I wish you well
in the future. I look forward to seeing you all in Court,
and I take pleasure in proposing the toast to you, the new
silks.
Sources
Pulling, Order of the Coif (1884)
Holdsworth, A History of English Law , (1945) Vols
V, (1937) VI and (1938) XII
Robertson, An Experience of Women: Pattern and Change
in Nineteenth-Century Europe (1982)
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- Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue
Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms: A report
by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian
Governments (1995) at 113.
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| 2 |
- Supreme Court of Japan, Justice in Japan at
13, 14.
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| 3 |
- (1875) 39 Wisc. 232 at 244-246.
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