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Speeches
SPEAKERS' FORUM
UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
17 AUGUST 1999
COURTS: FIRST AND FINAL
BY
THE HON JUSTICE IDF CALLINAN
OF THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
I was asked to select a topic for this talk to you today
and I chose "First and Final Courts". By "first" I did not
mean pre-eminent but the sort of Court that served the common
law system for so long and is to some extent, unhappily in
my view, declining in use today; that is a court constituted
by judge and jury. It is fashionable in some circles to criticise
juries and the role they play in deciding cases. I am not
one of those critics. Let me put aside for present purposes
criminal jury trials and talk about civil jury trials.
In this State, the role of a civil jury in what was one of
the few remaining preserves of the civil jury, defamation
cases, has recently been very much reduced. Juries no longer
decide the quantum of damages in such cases. I suspect that
the extravagance of juries in assessing damages has been greatly
exaggerated. It seems to me that the role of a jury in assessing
damages in such a case can be an appropriate one, for who
can better understand the impact of a gross libel upon a person
and the utter helplessness of a victim in seeking redress,
than a jury vindicating, by a substantial award of damages,
a shattered reputation?
However, defamation trials by jury on most issues are still
available in most jurisdictions in this country and personally
I would hope will continue.
It is said of barristers and former barristers that they
generally tend to remember only the cases they have won. Let
me at once tell you that in the defamation cases in which
I appeared and sometimes won and sometimes lost, I formed
a very healthy respect for juries in all of their fact-finding
exercises, including damages. Anecdotally it is my impression
that jury assessments of damages tended to be reversed with
no greater frequency by appeal courts than assessments of
damages by judges sitting alone in other cases.
So far as criminal trials are concerned the same holds true.
Of course juries sometimes fall into error but that is what
appeal courts are for and in the nature of things fewer verdicts
by juries, properly instructed, are likely to be reversed
than judgments by trial judges sitting alone. Judges are of
course, unlike juries, bound to give reasons for their decisions
and this in part tends to account for the high survival rate
of jury verdicts.
Attitudes to juries tend to be polarised. At one extreme
is the diatribe against them delivered by the distinguished
English scholar Glanville Williams in the seventh series of
the Hamlyn lectures when he said1
:
- "If one proceeds by the light of reason, there seems
to be a formidable weight of argument against the jury
system. To begin with, the twelve men and women are chosen
haphazard. There is [was at that time] a slight property
qualification - too slight to be used as an index of ability,
if indeed the mere possession of property can ever be
so used; on the other hand, exemption is given to some
professional people who would seem to be among the best
qualified to serve - clergymen, ministers of religion,
lawyers, doctors, dentists, chemists, justices of the
peace (as well as all ranks of the armed forces). The
subtraction of relatively intelligent classes means that
it is an understatement to describe a jury, with Herbert
Spencer, as a group of twelve people of average ignorance.
There is no guarantee that members of a particular jury
may not be quite unusually ignorant, credulous, slow-witted,
narrow-minded, biased or temperamental. The danger of
this happening is not one that can be removed by some
minor procedural adjustment; it is inherent in the English
notion of a jury as a body chosen from the general population
at random".
Now is neither the time nor the place to dissect and criticise
that somewhat elitist criticism probably uninformed by direct
experience of juries, but suffice to say that I would take block
with Lord Justice Devlin who, in the next year, in 1956, in
the eighth Hamlyn lecture series, said2
:
- "Each jury is a little Parliament. The jury sense is
the parliamentary sense. I cannot see the one dying and
the other surviving. The first object of any tyrant in
Whitehall would be to make Parliament utterly subservient
to his will; and the next to overthrow or diminish trial
by jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject's
freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen. So that
trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and
more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp
that shows freedom lives".
It is a matter of regret that most of you who go into practice
on the civil, rather than the criminal, side are very unlikely
to see a civil jury in action. On the other hand jury trials
continue to thrive in the criminal jurisdiction and those who
go to the criminal bar will have to learn to find a way to make
yourself intelligible and persuasive to a varied group of people,
sometimes in occupations and from backgrounds far removed from
this campus. I wish you every success in that regard. Practices
before juries are demanding and stimulating.
There is another advantage in jury trials, particularly ones
in which there are both difficult factual and legal issues.
A judge presiding over a jury trial, and counsel in it are
put to the very rigorous test of separating discrete factual
questions so that there may be a pure application of law to
them.
Now let me say something about final courts of which the
High Court is of course one.
Unlike in the United States neither in Australia nor the
United Kingdom has very much been written about the processes
by which the High Court and the House of Lords make their
decisions and write their judgments. Not surprisingly, in
that great melting pot of democracy and opinion, the United
States, masses of material, some of it well-informed, and
some of it speculative, are published annually.
Last year, a former law clerk to a justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States published an insider account of
the operations of the Court. It again brought into the public
spotlight some of the power plays and alleged intrigues of
the institution. I use the word "alleged" advisedly, because,
after reading the book, Closed Chambers , I was left
with the unmistakable impression that the author had not
understated his role as a clerk to one of the Justices,
and had also seen the publication of the book as an opportunity
to give the world the benefit of his opinions on the
various errors that he was satisfied some of the Justices
regularly made.
But it is not the first of such disclosures. The book, The
Brethren , published in 1979, revealed similar stories.
The latter, although again no doubt to be taken with a grain
of salt, I found considerably more readable and less self-righteous
than Closed Chambers . However the books did have in
common a generally consistent theme of deal-making between
Judges at times anxious to have a particular point of view
prevail.
Today I will make a few observations about the differences
and similarities between the two final appellate courts: the
United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia.
I should stress, however, that in doing so, I use as my sources
largely only the published material, such as the two books
already mentioned. Sadly, I am unable to offer you a personal
tour of the High Court in the style of Closed Chambers
or The Brethren . There will be no inappropriate
revelations.
Let me say a little first about the High Court. As you would
all know when it was established there were only three justices
and now there are seven, three of whom were Judges in New
South Wales at the time of their appointment to the High Court,
one of whom was a Solicitor-General in that State, another
who was a member of the Court of Appeal of Victoria, and myself,
on appointment in practice at the Bar in Queensland. In all
there have been 43 appointments to the High Court since it
first sat in Melbourne in 1903. That relatively small number
is attributable to two matters, that until 1977 Justices of
the High Court had a constitutionally entrenched life tenure,
and some had remarkable longevity, which is not to
suggest that the work has ever been easy or undemanding. Sir
Edward McTiernan served for 46 years and was 84 years old
when he retired. Sir Garfield Barwick served as Chief Justice
from 1964 until 1981 and was 78 years of age when failing
eyesight caused him to take what he would have regarded as
premature retirement as all of his other faculties remained
acute.
The circumstances of Justice McTiernan's retirement were
unusual. He had fractured his hip trying to squash a bug on
the floor of his bedroom and was confined to a wheelchair.
Because wheelchair access to the bench was not then available,
unlike today, McTiernan J was forced into retirement.
The work of the High Court of Australia is today almost exclusively
appellate and many of the current generation of lawyers are
unaware of a time when single Justices of the Court regularly
exercised original jurisdiction, in the diversity jurisdiction,
and in other fields such as tax and compensation on acquisitions
by the Commonwealth.
I am, as you will appreciate, a new boy on the block in the
Court and can only speak of my own short experience. I do
not think that I would be improperly divulging secrets by
telling you that nowadays the Justices of the Court meet informally
after a case is heard, in the Chambers of the Chief Justice,
or the most senior of the Justices if the Chief Justice has
not sat, to discuss the case. Tentative opinions are expressed
with a view to finding, if possible, some consensus. The Chief
Justice has also instituted a regular judgments meeting which
is still an informal, but slightly more structured conference
to take place over a day following each sittings of the Court.
The meetings are very useful because of the opportunity they
provide for the exchange of views, the reaching of consensual
opinions and judgments, when possible, and the identification,
and usually, in consequence, the narrowing of differences
between the Justices. No Justice seeks to exert any pressure
on the others and overall, I have found the process very helpful.
After a case has been heard and there have been discussions
about it sometimes a first judgment, or a subsequent one,
will be taken to be a draft, or substantially the judgment
of all of those Judges who agree with it. Sometimes such a
judgment will be the subject of agreement subject to qualifications.
Judges circulate all judgments to one another and exchange
suggestions by memoranda and discussion. This is really a
summary of what takes place in the Court these days after
the hearing.
I will now say something about the proceedings in the Court
themselves. Increasingly the Courts, including the High Court
are being asked to depend upon written materials. Those written
materials are important and very helpful. But there are two
cautions which need to be sounded about them from my own point
of view. There is a perception that the cost of litigation
can be measured by the amount of hearing time that a case
takes. That can be an unreliable guide. Generally speaking,
the shorter the hearing time on a complex case the greater
and the more prolonged the work may have been out of Court,
not only I might say by the parties and their lawyers, but
also the Court itself in preparing for the case and the writing
of the judgment.
The presentation of so much of a case in writing seems very
much to be at the heart of what all courts are being urged
to do, that is, actively to manage a case through all of its
phases. Some, including members of the judiciary, advocate
very active involvement in the process in lieu of the former
passive, detached determination of issues as they are presented
by the parties. Case management means exercising power to
control or direct not only the way in which the case is to
be presented in court but also the preparatory processes for
the hearing.
Not all commentators and judges share unqualified enthusiasm
for case management as it seems to be developing. No one could
possibly be in favour of needlessly prolonged and expensive
litigation but on the other hand it is important to keep sight
of the end, that is, the determination of a case in a way
that is not only impartial but also is seen to be impartial.
If a judge has descended to the level of the parties by, as
sometimes happens, telling one or other of them that a certain
interlocutory step is a luxury that cannot be afforded, or
that a party ought to be careful about relying upon some technical,
strict, legal right, then the judge may risk losing the appearance,
and perhaps even the reality of judicial impartiality. Moreover
there is, so far as I am aware, little hard evidence that
all judges are necessarily good administrators or managers.
The Australian Law Reform Commission has commented that judges
may not have the appropriate skills or experience to be able
to direct the course of a complex trial3
. It is a new thing for the courts to be so closely involved.
Often judges are not as well qualified to manage the case
as the parties4.
After all, Zander notes, the parties "live with the case"5.
Perhaps a time may come when judges will simply sit to hear
cases which until that point have been managed by other judges
or lawyers who have shown a particular aptitude for management.
A third risk is that a judge, despite his or her best endeavours
may have his or her open mind about a case unconsciously contaminated
by the very large volume of information concerning it gleaned
in managing it.
The manager receives extensive details of the case before
the hearing; about the parties involved, the process of discovery,
claims for privilege and the conduct of the various parties
in preparing for hearing. It is true to say that there is
extensive exposure of the manager to the parties and vice
versa. It is information unfiltered by the rules of evidence.
Some of it may be received ex parte, with no opportunity for
the other side to respond to the submissions or to contradict
them. It may provide, as one commentator thought "a fertile
field for growth of personal bias"6
.
Another caution that I offer against paper, or largely paper
trials and appeals, is that they can deny the Court the opportunity
of probing a submission and exploring the ramifications of
it. Speaking for myself, again, what I have found particularly
helpful are the testing and questions asked by the other Justices
of the High Court. One justice will sometimes ask a question
which counsel are unable to answer but another justice, anxious
to look at the case from all angles will answer it for that
counsel. Thus there can take place a stimulating debate as
the case develops, of a kind which would simply not occur
if the Court were left to consider written materials only,
either alone in their chambers, or even in conference.
One matter which I know is of particular interest to students
is the role of the Law clerks or Associates in the various
institutions. Law clerks, or "Associates" as we call them
here in Australia, exist in almost all ultimate courts in
the Western World. New Zealand, Canada, and even England now
have them. In fact it was only last year that the English
Court of Appeal appointed its first "Judicial Assistants"
to the Lords of Appeal7.
The relationship of clerks to the Justices they serve has
been described in the United States as:
- "The most intense and mutually dependent one outside
of a marriage, parenthood or a love affair."8
And as:
- "Professional only in part, it is a close human relationship,
one that endures long after the clerkship ends."9
A Judge has to rely upon his or her staff in many ways. Trustworthiness
and an ability to maintain confidentiality are critically
important qualities in an Associate. The High Court insists
that Associates comply with a detailed protocol which precludes
them from making disclosures of confidential matters of which
they inevitably become aware, and also forbids them to publish
any material during the terms of their Associateships.
It is inappropriate to discuss judgments outside chambers,
or to rely on people for research who are outside the Court.
Mostly when they are first appointed, Judges come to the Bench
from the Bar, where they are used to interacting with a broad
range of people in their working day. On the Bench, one is
more reliant on the Associate not only for research but also
for companionship and some social interaction in the work
place.
I will make some more general observations about some important
differences between the Supreme Court and the High Court,
at a high level of abstraction.
One thing that may surprise an Australian lawyer on reading
The Brethren was just how much information the authors
had managed to obtain or claimed to obtain. Interviews with
over 200 people, mostly, wait for it former law clerks. Also,
there was unpublished material made available to the authors,
including, quite surprisingly, internal memoranda between
the Justices10.
That is really very significant. It is unlikely to happen
here.
The contrast is in the availability of published material
on the High Court. In fact, it has been noted that in both
Australia and Canada, there has been practically no informed
consideration of the institutions.
The US Constitution, unlike the Australian equivalent, contains
a Bill of Rights, and rights to freedom of speech, religion
and assembly. Its existence involves the Court in the most
political and controversial issues of the day. The Supreme
Court rules on rights issues, such as obscenity, abortion,
and the death penalty. It is not just the Justices' toes that
are dipped in the cauldron: each Justice is inevitably drawn
deeply into its boiling brew of politics, the attributed or
perceived social values of innumerable groups in a population
of 240 million or more people, federal state relations and
such other matters as the parties can persuade the Court are
constitutional rights issues.
In both Closed Chambers and The Brethren ,
the authors refer to the immense volume of mail sent by the
general public to Justices in relation to matters before the
Court, or matters on which the Court had recently ruled. In
Closed Chambers , Lazurus talks about some thousands
of letters sent to (the recently deceased) Justice Blackmun
in connection with the abortion decisions of that time. Happily
I certainly have not received, and I doubt whether my colleagues
have ever received such a volume of fan mail.
Owing perhaps to the absence of a Bill of Rights, cases before
the High Court do not involve the same level of politics,
or discretion. Indeed the Australian model does not provide
the same opportunity for personal or idiosyncratic views to
influence the outcome of a case, even subconsciously. Anyway,
the figures speak for themselves. High Court cases are by
no means as sensationalist or intriguing. There are currently
22 per cent criminal, 56 per cent civil and just 22 per cent
Constitutional appeals annually11.
Although work on the High Court may lack some of the excitement
(overrated in practice I suspect) of involvement in the affairs
of the day, it does offer a degree of variety and contact
with a vast range of legal issues which in general the United
States Supreme Court does not have an opportunity to explore.
Americans seem to be much more closely concerned with the
activities of their Court. Indeed one might very well infer
that Americans generally take a closer interest in political
issues of the day, in which, because of the Bill of Rights,
the Supreme Court is a player. I am sure a higher percentage
of the American public could name at least a few members of
the Supreme Court bench. Many more could name seminal cases
and the area of law that the Court has been called upon to
consider. I doubt whether that is so in this country.
The Supreme Court is scrutinised by a body of people known
as "Supreme Court watchers". In a recent article in the Washington
Post , the writer notes12:
- "Supreme Court watchers are second only to the old Cold
War Kremlinologists in their obsessiveness: They parse communications,
wire up sources and sleuth for any sign of movement at the
top."
In the same article, the author Joan Biskupic wrote " advocacy
groups constantly watch the nine leather chairs, the administration
keeps an ear cocked for any sign of movement and the media cannot
help obsessing on a potentially big story."
There is also a large and informed Supreme Court press corps.
Almost all journalists attached to the Court have legal qualifications
and the most senior has been reporting for 39 years.
It is as a result of the North American culture and Americans'
interest in public institutions that the Justices there do
not enjoy the same degree of anonymity as we do as Justices
in Australia. I must say that so far as I am concerned I wouldn't
mind being a lot more anonymous still.
Take Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
from 1969 to 1986. Travelling under a pseudonym; disguising
himself by dressing to avoid recognition and going everywhere
with an armed chauffeur and guards to protect him from publicity
still did not prevent him from being recognised and criticized13
.
I think that privacy of public officials, and the society
which respects it, are both positive forces. Anonymity allows
Justices to pursue their work and private lives without unnecessary
interference. There is a balance to be maintained. How can
judges be expected to keep in touch with "real life" if they
are forced to retreat from it? How can they be expected to
be well-balanced people if they cannot be normal participants
in mainstream society? On the other hand, a Judge has to be
careful neither to become a participant in nor to appear to
be a participant in, political affairs or controversies which
could come before the Court, or in respect of which it is
not appropriate that Judges play a role.
Another striking feature of the United States Supreme Court
is the lack of any mandatory retiring age. Justices are appointed
to the Supreme Court for life. The lack of a statutory age
of senility, as it has been described, allowed Justice Black
to retire at 85, Justice Brennan at 84 and Justice Marshall,
the Court's first African American Justice, to retire at 85.
Justice Stevens in currently the oldest on the Bench, and
is aged 78.
Although not all justices stay well into old age, many spend
a long time on the Bench. The present Chief Justice, Rehnquist
is entering his 26th year on the Bench. Douglas J recorded
a massive 36 years. Since 1965, the primary reason for retiring
from the Court has been age in more than half of departures
from the Court14
. Justice Douglas' record is said to be rivalled only by that
of Australia's Justice McTiernan, who spent a record 46 years
as a Justice of the High Court.
In Australia, as most of you know, a High Court Justice must
now retire at 70. The referendum in 1967 concerning the power
of the Commonwealth to make laws for Aboriginal people is
often cited as the occasion on which the population most overwhelmingly
embraced constitutional change. What is less well publicised
is the fact that the 1977 referendum was the second most overwhelming
embrace of change by substitution for life tenure of federal
judges, including High Court Justices, of a compulsory retirement
age of 70. What does this tell us about the Australian people?
They were very concerned to recognise Aboriginal rights and
entitlements and to ensure that judges not overstay their
welcome.
In The Brethren , the authors recount an incident
that occurred when Justice Harlan was ill and in hospital.
He insisted on working, even though virtually blind. The story
goes like this15.
- "One day a clerk brought in an emergency petition. Harlan
J remained in bed as he discussed the case with the clerk.
They agreed that the petition should be denied. Justice
Harlan bent down, his eyes virtually to the paper, wrote
his name, and handed the paper to his clerk. The clerk saw
no signature. He looked over at Harlan J.
- Justice Harlan, you just denied your sheet', the clerk
said gently, pointing to a scrawl on the linen."
One problem about the absence of a compulsory retirement age
is that sometimes those least able to assess their capacity
to do the work are most likely to continue to try to do it.
Unfortunately there will always be vigorous, highly alert
septuagenarians with much to contribute who will be civilian
casualties of the Constitutional amendment but that may be
an acceptable price to pay for the avoidance of occasional
real, as opposed to statutory senility.
Many Judges, though, lead quite active lives, even later
in life. President Nixon sniggered about Justice Douglas'
marrying for the fourth time - to a 25 years old law student,
when the Judge was 7016
. Justice McTiernan married for the first and only time at
the age of 56, to his faithful secretary of many years, Ms
Kathleen Elliott. She was apparently a formidable lady.
In the US, oral argument is not obligatory. Where there is
oral argument, strict time limits are imposed. Alternatively,
a case may be given "summary consideration"; that is, without
oral argument, and in relation to which only a brief, unanimous,
opinion is issued by the Court as a whole. Further, cases
can be stood over for re-argument. Cert. petitions, which
are applications to persuade the Court that the case should
be heard in full, are determined on the papers only; there
is no oral argument. Each Justice has oversight of one or
more of the 11 appeals circuits, which involves dealing with
special and emergency petitions, such as those often brought
in death penalty cases.
In Australia, while Special Leave applications are strictly
timed, they too almost always involve oral argument.
A further illustration of the US court's different technique
is the convention of the assignment by the Chief Justice of
the writing of opinions. That has been described as an important
source of real power17.
Justice Blackmun said that a Justice who was "in the doghouse"
with Chief Justice Burger might be assigned one of the "crud"
opinions "that nobody wants to write".18
There has been some controversy here and in the United States
about the Courts' selection of cases for hearing. David Stewart
wrote of the US system19:
- "As each term of the Supreme Court begins, many lawyers
look over the Court's schedule or arguments and ask, Why
did they grant cert. to so many dogs?" That sometimes prompts
a follow-up question. Why did the justices refuse to hear
other cases of at least equal importance?"
This brings me to law clerks. According to Lazurus, the involvement
of the law clerk in chambers business in the United States is
all-pervasive. He claims, I emphasize, "claims", that they participate
in inter-chambers negotiations, and that they also virtually
decide cert. applications and even draft opinions. If this account
is accepted, then the law clerk wields an influence in the Supreme
Court which simply would not be tolerated in Australia.
But I think any account such as this must be balanced with
the other side of the story. It has been observed that "law
clerks, in describing themselves, often inflate their own
importance and power"20.
It would not be surprising when you consider that the number
of cases filed in the Court had increased from about 1,372
in 1951-55 to 4,786 in 1986-90 and I am told more than 7,000
last year21.
Recently, the Washington Post reported a demonstration
of 1000 people on the steps of the Supreme Court22.
The demonstration decried the lack of diversity among the
Justices' staff. Only one of the current clerks is Hispanic.
Since 1972, fewer than 20 per cent of the 428 clerks have
been African American, the article pointed out. What the protest
shows is that it is widely assumed that the clerks are occupants
of positions of influence.
The article alleged:
- "Supreme Court clerks play a crucial role in shaping
American law. They recommend which appeals should be heard,
develop questions for justices to use at oral arguments
and often write first drafts of opinions supporting their
justices' positions on cases."
Clerks go on to hold positions of influence in the legal profession;
and elsewhere. The article further claimed:
- "Beyond their ability to influence the high court's work,
clerks frequently continue on to command high salaries at
private law firms or hold influential positions in government
or as law professors."
There have been occasions recently where the involvement of
the law clerk has been noted - by the Court itself. Justice
Scalia said in Conroy v Aniskoff23:
- "I confess that I have not personally investigated the
entire legislative history - or even that portion of it
which relates to the four statutes listed above. The excerpts
I have examined and quoted were unearthed by a hapless law
clerk to whom I assigned the task."
There is also the Alabama case in which the Court gave one very
lucky clerk a pretty good wrap as they would say24:
- "This Memorandum of Opinion was prepared by William G
Somerville III Law Clerk, in which the Court fully concurs."
There are many indications in the published material of "subterfuges"
of the clerks on the Court. When Chief Justice Burger came to
the Court in 1969, he was convinced something had to be done
about the clerks' network. He began by attacking the underground
inter-chambers communications system by issuing a memorandum
on confidentiality. Some clerks, the Chief wrote25:
- "at times have a tendency to develop a collective Law
Clerks' decision to resolve cases on the merits before the
Justices themselves have worked out the answers. Of special
importance in this regard is the conversation which takes
place in the Law Clerk Dining Room. Law Clerks generally
view the lunch period as a unique period to exchange insights
and stories about their justices. It has been customary
for Law Clerks to discuss with one another the most intimate
of matters relating to their Justices with the understanding
that none of what is said shall go beyond the four walls
of the Dining Room. While such conversation can be both
educational and entertaining for the Law Clerks, the extent
to which such information is not carried beyond the Dining
Room is questionable."
The Chief concluded by saying that no information was to be
revealed about him which would tend to place him in an unfavourable
light.
I need hardly repeat that none of this is the Australian
experience or practice.
Courts the target
I turn to another topic now, media criticism of the Courts
in Australia.
One preoccupation of some judges in Australia at the present
time is with the barage of criticism, not always fully informed
with which they are being bombarded. Such criticism can of
course be very hurtful. But public life is in some respects
a little like the theatre with which I have had some acquaintance.
Neither actors nor authors can afford the luxury of sensitivity.
I've never read any description of a judge of the kind used
in respect of an actor, Dennis Quilley, in a musical version
of " Blithe Spirit " by Noel Coward. Bernard Levin
said this:
- "Denis Quilley played the role with all the charm and
animation of the leg of a billiard table."
When Michael Redgrave played the lead in " Hobson's
Choice " the poison pen critic, Kenneth Tynan said
that although some critics had seen overtones of Lear in his
portrayal, he thought a somewhat bad tempered Father Christmas
would have been nearer the mark.
When Terrence Stamp played Dracula, The Times' dramatic critic
said that he had nothing to offer except a noble profile,
his entrances were insignificant, his voice without menace
or mystery and his physical tricks consisted largely of flapping
his cloak like a bat failing to take off.
One of the most damming criticisms was of a play by JB Priestley
called " When We Are Married ". One critic said:
- "It would make an ideal treat as a night out for your
despicable inlaws. Send them a couple of tickets and then
meet them later at the Theatre restaurant for a blazing
row."
Criticisms therefore that have been made of the courts seem
by comparison to be rather mild stuff.
However enough of the media. There are more serious matters
to be considered.
It has been said of the United States Supreme Court that
cases that reach the Court usually represent conflicts between
highly commendable principles none of which can fully prevail
in life on earth; each is apt to have impressive legal backing.
In such conflicts the law is far from clear, yet the judges
must somehow decide cases.
The High Court does not with the same frequency have to decide
cases of such volatility as fall to be decided under the US
Bill of Rights. But in recent times the High Court has had
to deal with issues about which many people are emotional
and hold strong views: race and land, ( Mabo , Wik
, Kartinyeri , Fejo , North Ganalanja
Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland ), religion ( Plimer
v Roberts special leave application 1998), children (
NT v GPAO , AMS v AIF ), the spoils of property
in marriage ( Mallett v Mallett ), politics ( Sykes
v Cleary , Sue v Hill ), and, all the time, money
and property. In issues such as these there will always be
unhappy losers.
Jefferson once said that a court of able, independent judges
would not buckle before the frenzy of citizens commanding
wrong. I hope that is true of the Court on which I have the
honour to serve.
Well that brings me to the end of what I have to say to you
today. I see I have over-run my allocated time. I thank the
executive of the University of New South Wales Law Society
and Julian Leeser for inviting me to speak today. I thank
those present for listening.
| 1 |
Endnotes
The Proof of Guilt , 3rd ed (1963) at 271-272.
|
| 2 |
Trial By Jury at 164. |
| 3 |
Review of the Adversarial System of Litigation ,
IP 20, April 1997 at 41-42. |
| 4 |
See for example Zander, "The Woolf Report: Forwards
or Backwards for the New Chancellor?" (1997) 16 Civil
Justice Quarterly at 216. |
| 5 |
Zander, "The Woolf Report: Forwards or Backwards for
the New Chancellor?" (1997) 16 Civil Justice Quarterly
at 217. |
| 6 |
Resnik, "Managerial Judges" (1982) 96 Harvard Law
Review at 427. |
| 7 |
See Vine, "Judicial Assistants: Junior Tenants in the
Court of Appeal?", June (1998) Counsel 22. |
| 8 |
Wald, "Selecting Law Clerks", (1990) 89 Michigan
Law Review 152-163 at 153. |
| 9 |
Kozinski, "Confessions of a Bad Apple", (1991) 100 Yale
Law Journal 1707-1730 at 1708. |
| 10 |
See The Brethren at 4. |
| 11 |
Source: High Court of Australia Annual Report 1997-98
at 59. |
| 12 |
"Court Followers Tensely Await Justice Stevens's Verdict:
to Stay or Go?", Washington Post Sunday June 14
1998 p A2. |
| 13 |
See The Brethren at 135-136. |
| 14 |
Baum, The Supreme Court , 4th ed (1992) at 67. |
| 15 |
See The Brethren at 157. |
| 16 |
See The Brethren at 18. |
| 17 |
Baum, The Supreme Court , 4th ed (1992) at 163. |
| 18 |
Baum, The Supreme Court , 4th ed (1992) at 164. |
| 19 |
"An Inside Peek at How the Court Picks its Cases", (February
1985) 71 American Bar Association Journal at 110. |
| 20 |
Bloch and Krattenmaker, Supreme Court Politics: The
Institution and its Procedures , (1994) at 502. |
| 21 |
Baum, The Supreme Court , 4th ed (1992) at 111. |
| 22 |
"As Term Opens, Lack of Diversity is Decried", Washington
Post , Tuesday 6 October 1996 p A3. |
| 23 |
123 Ed 2d 229 at 243 (1993). |
| 24 |
Acceptance and Insurance Company v Schafner 651
F Supp 776 at 778 (ND Ala 1986). |
| 25 |
See The Brethren at 34-35. |
|